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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
The Indifferent Subnational State: Sinaloan State Government relations 
 with its Diaspora in Los Angeles 
by  
Fernando Enrique Villegas Rivera 
Master of Arts in Chicana and Chicano Studies  
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Chair  
 
The Mexican state of Sinaloa has not developed diaspora policies directed to the Sinaloan Diaspora 
in the United States, even though the economic and social contributions to the state are significant 
and despite the existence of a significant group of Sinaloans in a situation of extreme vulnerability 
due to their precarious legal status. Current literature on diaspora policies has not developed a 
framework to understand atypical cases such as the case of Sinaloa. I developed a mixed method 
research design case study of state-diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational 
field. I argue that political, economic, and organizational factors explain the absence of diaspora 
policies. Findings suggest that this is due to anti-democratic orientations of Sinaloan local 
governments, lack of strong Sinaloan Hometown Associations, and low remittance dependency at 
the state level. Only municipalities with few resources have developed a relationship with the 
diaspora or are willing to do so.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the context of international migration, home state governments have increasingly approached 
their diasporas in the past three decades. Among emigration states, the case of Mexico is unique 
and exemplar since it is considered the leading state in the development of diaspora policies 
according to various scholars such as Délano (2018) and Ortega (2013 and 2012), and some 
Mexican diplomats1. From 1990 onwards, the Mexican state transitioned from a limited 
engagement approach towards its diaspora to a more active and institutionalized relationship 
(Santamaría 1994; Délano 2018; Waldinger 2014; Goldring 2002; González 2006). This increase 
in their relationship crystalized in the creation of different institutions and laws to recognize the 
Mexican diaspora’s needs.  
Indeed, the Mexican state at its different administrative levels −federal, state and municipal−, along 
with their counterparts in the United States (e.g. Hometown Associations, NGO’s, migrant-led 
organizations, among other actors), helped to create conditions for a better integration of migrants 
in their communities of residence with the purpose of defending them against anti-immigrant 
policies, and/or to tap into their influence for development in Mexico (Délano 2011 and 2018; 
Fitzgerald 2008). After the implementation of diaspora policies2 at the federal level, state-diaspora 
relations at the subnational or local level3 increased, especially since 2000’s (Valenzuela 2007). 
                                                      
1 Personal interview with Adriana Argaiz, Mexican Consul for Community Affairs in Los Angeles, U.S. (December 
2018).  
2 Scholars use different forms to refer to diaspora policies such as “diaspora bureaucracies”, “diaspora engagement 
policies”, “diaspora management policies” among others and we have to recognize that there is no consensus. For the 
purposes of my work, I will use Délano (2018: 7) conceptualization of diaspora policies which are policies that “aim 
to strengthen ties between emigrant communities and their countries of origin”. 
3 The political-administrative territorial limits in Mexico comprise 32 entidades federativas (federal entities) to which 
I will be referring as states. In turn, each state is constituted by municipalities of which we find 2457 throughout the 
country (INEGI 2019) 
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Accordingly, almost all states in Mexico have created diaspora policies at some level, although 
their development has been more prevalent in states from the Historical region4. Regardless, most 
states have created different programs, institutions and policies for their diasporas as it has been 
documented by scholars such as Ortega (2012; 2013), Yrizar and Alarcón (2006), Fernández de 
Castro et al (2007), Valenzuela (2007), Vila (2007), and Moctezuma (2015). 
Map 1. Migratory regions in Mexico 
 
Source: Durand and Massey (2003: 71) 
From a methodological point of view, diaspora policies have begun to be explored more recently 
in some of the states of the Central region5 such as Mexico City (Délano 2019), Hidalgo, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Mexico state, or Morelos (Fernández de Castro 2006; Vila 2007). However, this topic has 
                                                     
4 Durand and Massey (2003) categorize the Mexican territory into 4 regions: Historical, Border, Central, and 
Southeast. The historical region, which is the most studied, is comprised by the following states: Zacatecas, 
Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Durango, San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, Nayarit and Colima. Migration to the 
U.S. from these states represented more than 50% of the entire Mexican emigration between 1925 and 2000. 
5 States from the Central region: Mexico City, State of Mexico, Oaxaca, Morelos, Puebla, Hidalgo, Querétaro and 
Tlaxcala (Durand and Massey 2003) 
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not been analyzed in states from the rest of the regions but with some very few exceptions (Ortega 
2012 and 2013; Vila 2007). It is clear that more studies are needed for understanding the 
emergence of diaspora policies in states from the border and southeast region.  
Theoretically, studies on diaspora policies at the subnational level are scarce. Moreover, few 
scholars have directed their efforts to understand this phenomenon in negative cases, id est, cases 
where there is a lack of interest or indifference on the part of national or local governments. For 
instance, in a quantitative study on diaspora policies of thirty-five national states, Ragazzi (2014) 
found that “indifferent states” are often overlooked in the literature, making this type of cases an 
interesting counter-factual object of analysis. He briefly theorizes this “indifference” or lack of 
interest of sending countries as a result of the political-economic model adopted by a country. In 
the case of indifferent states, they are characterized by a type of government relying on traditional 
welfare state policies, open borders, significant fiscal pressures, and partially regulated labor 
markets. However, because of the broad quantitative nature of this study, the “minor details” are 
lost, and the author recognizes that qualitative data and interdisciplinary collaboration is crucial to 
“confirm, refine, or dismiss” his findings (Ragazzi 2014: 86). 
Meanwhile, Klekowski (2017) emphasize the gaps in the field and calls for research on the role of 
Nonstate Actors (NSA) in order to decenter state-centric understandings, and to advance research 
at the micro level of analysis that take into account not only the national or federal scale. Similarly, 
Cohen (2017) noticed the existence of just a couple of studies focusing on municipal policies, 
however in this case, actions focus on migrant returnees (Föbker, Temme, and Wiegandt, 2014; 
Nijenhuis & Leung, 2014; Chacko 2007 cited in Cohen 2017). It is still unclear why there is a lack 
of engagement on the part of home state governments towards their diasporas or vice versa. For 
instance, in cases where the remittances sent by migrants of a particular state contribute 
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significantly to the state economy, it would be expected that the state government would respond 
in an instrumental way, that is, they would have to court migrants in order to potentiate their 
remittances, according to the “tapping” perspective. In reality, the response of states and types of 
engagements with their diasporas are not always explained by current theories. 
As a result of this lacunas, several calls have been raised for conducting studies in states where 
there is a “lack of interest” or “indifference” for developing diaspora policies at the national and 
subnational levels (Délano and Harris 2017; Ortega 2013; Cohen 2017; Ragazzi 2014, Klekowski 
2017, and Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).  
Two other conceptual frameworks are relevant to discuss: literature on transnationalism and 
international relations. In both fields, there is also a lack of studies directing their efforts to 
comprehend the relations between diasporas and the local governments of their countries of origin, 
especially those involving migrant-led transnational organizations and local state and municipal 
governments. As such, there is no consensus on the causes and consequences of these type of 
engagements (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016).  
In response to the aforementioned methodological and theoretical lacunas within the literature on 
diaspora policies, transnationalism, and international relations, I explored the transnational process 
occurring between the Sinaloan state government and its diaspora in the United States. Sinaloa is 
located in Northwestern Mexico with a historical connection to Los Angeles. In this state, the local 
government has not developed strong relations with its U.S. based diaspora in recent decades; 
despite the importance of their economic contributions to the state’s economy and notwithstanding 
the significant number of Sinaloans living in the U.S, mainly in Los Angeles. 
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Map 2. Sinaloa’s Geographic Location 
 
Source: INEGI (2019) 
Indeed, Ortega (2013) already noted that Sinaloa has one of the lowest levels of institutional 
capacity for approaching the diaspora among all Mexican states. How do we explain low levels of 
diaspora policies in cases such as Sinaloa where the significance of the migratory phenomenon 
would signal the development of higher levels of outreach from the Sinaloan state government for 
instrumental purposes? A broad question posited by Délano and Harris’ (2017) is also relevant 
here since it has not been explored in depth: why is it that some diasporas are 
“recognized/nurtured” while others are “neglected/denied” by different actors in both the country 
of origin and destination?  
From this puzzle or research problem arise two specific research questions that my study will 
answer: What factors explain the absence of diaspora policies in Sinaloa? To what extent has the 
role of the Sinaloan government been crucial in shaping variations of State-diaspora transnational 
relations in Sinaloa and Los Angeles from 1990 to 2018? 
In this paper, I argue that the lack of a significant relationship and collaboration between Sinaloan 
local governments, especially at the state level, and its diaspora is due to different factors that I 
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classify into three types: political, economic, and organizational. These three spheres also vary 
depending on the level of analysis6.  
• Political factors explain the lack of an institutionalized or more active relationship between 
the Sinaloan state government and the diaspora, due to anti-democratic orientations on the 
part of Sinaloan political elites. Until now, Sinaloan state governments have been able to 
exclude important sectors of the society without high political costs. At the municipal level, 
although there has been a significant increase in electoral competition between political 
parties in the past two decades, party elites and municipal governments have not needed to 
open spaces for the participation of citizens, regardless where they are located.  
• The economic sphere helps us to partially understand state-diaspora relations in Sinaloa. 
Although family remittances are important for the state’s economy, and especially for 
thousands of families, these resources have not been significant enough to influence the 
state government to create diaspora policies directed to Sinaloan migrants. Since Sinaloa’s 
economy does not depend on migrant family or collective remittances, they are able to 
exclude migrants from the polity. Only municipalities with few economic resources have 
developed a relationship with the diaspora or are willing to do so more actively.  
• Organizational sphere:  Strong and institutionalized Sinaloan HTA’s in L.A. are absent. 
The few Sinaloan HTAs have not been able to demand their inclusion as transnational 
citizens with full rights vis-à-vis their home state.  In turn, this is due to the existence of a 
                                                      
6 E.g. economic factors could be relevant in explaining state-diaspora relations in specific Sinaloan municipalities but 
not so at the state level. 
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weak Sinaloan migrant civil society, which can be explained by the socioeconomic 
characteristics and precarious legal status of the Sinaloan diaspora in the United States.  
In conjunction, these three spheres help to explain why the Sinaloan state government has not 
developed policies for the diaspora and why there is no significant relationship between both group 
of actors: migrants and the local government. This study will provide new insights and evidence 
in understanding why some subnational states and municipalities are not courting and/or 
supporting their diaspora by focusing on this paradigmatic case.  
DATA AND METHODS 
My research focuses on the Sinaloan state-diaspora relations in the US-Mexico transnational field 
in response to calls raised by scholars from the fields in question,  and because organized Sinaloan 
migrants themselves, specifically members of the Fraternidad Sinaloense de California (from now 
on FSC) −the main Sinaloan HTA−, are demanding to the state their inclusion as transnational 
citizens. To be able to respond my research questions, I developed a mixed method research design 
case study of state-diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational field. Transnational 
fields represent a set of multiple set of interconnected social networks in which ideas, practices 
and resources are exchanged, organized, and transformed. These spaces are multi-dimensional and 
function in different forms, levels and depth (Levitt 2005). In attending the transnational approach 
and different levels of analysis, I am in line with Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) critique to 
what they called methodological nationalism, or the prevalent assumption in social sciences that 
nations are the basic unit of inquiry. Accordingly, I have conducted fieldwork in both the United 
States and Mexico and have collected information from Mexican state officials at the federal, state, 
and municipal level. 
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In my study, the information obtained of the Sinaloan diaspora in the U.S. is not representative 
due to limitations in terms of data. There is no enough available information for understanding 
their transnational relation with their home governments. Then, due to availability in information, 
and because it has been proved that Mexican migrants that are members of Hometown 
Associations are one the most transnationally involved in politics among different types of 
Mexican migrants in the U.S. (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2016; Portes et al 2008), I focus on the 
relations between Sinaloan HTA’s and the Mexican state at the federal, state and municipal level. 
I emphasize here the relation between the FSC, the largest and most important Sinaloan migrant-
led membership organization in the U.S., and the Mexican state.  
For collecting and analyzing data, I used a mixed methodology approach that includes quantitative 
and qualitative information. Qualitative methods include: Analysis of relevant literature, 30 
extensive interviews, information provided through emails and via messaging platforms with key 
informants such as leaders of the FSC, Mexican government officials at different levels in Mexico, 
and informal conversations with residents of different communities in Sinaloa. I also conducted 
direct observation at different locales where organized immigrants have or used to have presence 
in Sinaloa, in order to understand the impact of the resources they send and the evolution of 
collective remittances through time, and to identify their counterparts at the municipal level. I 
travelled to Zacatecas, one of the states were diaspora policies first emerged, to interview leading 
experts on the topic and government officials working with migrants in the development of 
diaspora policies.  
The criterion I used to choose my interviewees comes from Maxwell’s (2005) participant selection 
strategy. He argues that purposeful selection strategy is the most important element to consider in 
qualitative selection decisions. He describes this method as: “a strategy in which particular 
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settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can’t 
be gotten as well from other choices”.  I also relied on additional sources of information including 
research on newspapers, magazine articles, government publications, and official consular memos.  
With respect to quantitative data, I draw from databases from different U.S. and Mexican national 
institutions as well as from international organizations. Specifically, I draw on data from the 
Programa 3 x 1 para Migrantes to measure state-diaspora relations between organized Sinaloans 
in the U.S. via Hometown Associations (to which I refer sometimes simply as "the diaspora" or 
the "organized diaspora"), and also to measure the impact of these resources in their communities 
of origin in Sinaloa. 
To measure the organizational development of the Sinaloan diaspora, I used the Instituto de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) database, which is the largest source of information gathering data 
on Mexican migrant-led organizations in the world, and information of organizations provided by 
the FSC.  
Databases from Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
(SEDESOL), Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO)/BBVA, and Banco de México 
(BANXICO), along with existing research served for understanding the migratory phenomenon in 
general and the living conditions and socioeconomic variables of Sinaloans in Mexico and in the 
U.S.  
LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
To elucidate the proposed queries, I present first current debates in the fields of state-diaspora 
relations, international relations, and transnationalism from a multidisciplinary approach since I 
used concepts and theories from sociology, political science, and international relations. As 
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Durand and Massey (2003) have argued, multidisciplinarity is needed when studying the 
complexities of the migratory phenomenon. The literature review enables us to better understand 
the processes that explain how transnational relations between home state governments at different 
levels and the diaspora are formed, constituted and strengthened or weakened.  
In Chapter two, I briefly delineate the current context regarding state-diaspora relations across the 
globe in order to identify larger trends. Afterwards, since a historical perspective is crucial if we 
want to understand when, why and how diaspora policies emerged in Mexico, my third chapter 
presents an explanatory framework that observes a unique increase in state-diaspora relations that 
begun at the end of the twentieth century due to political and economic reasons. More specifically, 
the 1990s marked the beginning of a new stage in Mexican State-diaspora relations. Currently, the 
relation between the Mexican state and its diaspora has been institutionalized and strengthened as 
a response to a hostile political climate against Latino migrants. In another section of this chapter, 
I explain why and how Mexican subdiasporas started to collaborate in a more frequent manner 
with municipal and state governments since the 2000’s. I also present the literature review to 
explain how scholars have studied the emergence of diaspora policies at the subnational level.  
In Chapter four, I provide a first approach for understanding the paradigmatic case of state-
diaspora relations in the Sinaloa-Los Angeles transnational field. To do so, I describe the origins, 
evolution and current state of Sinaloan Migration to the Los Angeles region. I also describe the 
amount of remittances sent to Sinaloa in the past two decades and I explain the significance of 
these resources for Sinaloans. Then, in this same chapter, I describe the organizational forms that 
Mexican and Sinaloan migrants have developed in the U.S., since the beginning of the 19th century, 
focusing in California and L.A. Is in this chapter that I trace the origins of Sinaloan Hometown 
Associations and their relation with the state, and I provide original non-published information 
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about the phenomenon, it’s causes and effects on the community. In addition, I traced the origins 
of the Fraternidad Sinaloense de California −the largest and most important Sinaloan migrant-led 
membership organization in the U.S.− and the relation established with different governments 
across time. I contribute to the literature with original data on the creation and evolution of the 
FSC. 
Finally, in chapter five, I conducted an analysis of the factors explaining the absence of diaspora 
policies in Sinaloa. To perform a systematic analysis, I used a multifactorial and multilevel 
approach in which I grouped the main factors in three spheres: political, economic, and 
organizational. I analyzed the impact of these three groups of factors at the subnational state and 
municipal levels. The significance of these spheres sometimes varies depending the level of 
analysis.  
2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS: STATE-DIASPORA 
RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TRANSNATIONALISM 
In this section I succinctly delineate the main debates underlying this essay. I present current 
debates in the field of state-diaspora relations and useful concepts from the discipline of 
international relations. Both frameworks are necessary to better understand the relations between 
states at the subnational level and their diasporas. I used concepts from the disciplines of 
international relations, sociology, and political science since a multidisciplinary approach is 
necessary to understand the migratory phenomenon, as it has been recognized by scholars such as 
Durand and Massey (2003). Afterwards, I explore current debates on transnationalism, and I 
explain how this field has been reconceptualized to unveil the role of the state in the development 
of transnational relations and policies towards the diaspora. At the end of the chapter I provide an 
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explanation on the emergence of transnational communities and HTAs by taking into account the 
concepts of social capital and social networks.   
STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS 
There have been efforts on the part of academics and policy makers to develop the field of state-
diaspora relations in the past two decades. Now, we have a good amount of both quantitative and 
qualitative studies to better understand the reasons for the emergence of diaspora policies at the 
national level, what the characteristics are of the states that are more prone to develop them, and 
the type of diaspora policies they implement (Délano 2018).  
If we map the different frameworks that explain the emergence of diaspora policies, we will find 
that there are three main explanatory realms. The first one has been called by some scholars as the 
“tapping” perspective (Délano 2018; Gamlen et al 2017). According to Gamlen et al (2017), the 
main goals in developing diaspora policies are related to the instrumental use of migrant resources 
for development and for security reasons on the part of the emigration state.  
The second perspective has been recognized as the “embracing” framework, and its main goals 
have to do with how origin-states embrace their diaspora to shape its own political identity and 
goes beyond instrumental motivations such as economic and political interests on the part of states. 
States do this by developing the national and ethnic identity of their citizens (Gamlen et al 2017; 
Délano 2018).  
A third perspective has been denominated “governing” or “governance” framework, which put 
more emphasis on external factors in comparison with the first two perspectives I explained. That 
is, for advocates of the governance perspective, international organizations and some states 
influence how other states will govern migration. In this sense, diaspora institutions implemented 
across the globe are a reflection of a global system of migration in which states of origin and 
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destination share a responsibility in the management of migratory movements of people. As 
Gamlen et al (2017) put it: “states needed to find ways of ‘sharing responsibility’ for the various 
burdens and benefits of migration”. This perspective has gained more support since the evidence 
found to date indicates that more states are following this logic (Gamlen et al 2017).  
In sum, national emigration states approach their diasporas for three main reasons: as a form of 
conceptualizing the diaspora as an asset; as a way of recognizing the importance of the diaspora 
in the process of identity formation of the state of origin; and as a result of shared global norms or 
mode of governance between countries across the globe (Goldring 2002: Délano 2011; Délano and 
Harris 2017; Délano 2018; Gamlen, Cummings and Vaaler 2017; Cohen 2017).  
Still, some lacunas of knowledge are still prevalent. We need much more research to explain why 
there is an absence of diaspora policies or lack of interest on the part of states to develop them. 
Ragazzi (2014) offered one of the few theorizations for understanding these types of cases, where 
the impact of remittances in the sending-state would signal the development of a policy for their 
diaspora to increase such resources, although they are not developing diaspora policies. Nigeria 
and Belgium experiences are representative of these cases where the explanatory capacity of the 
instrumental hypothesis aforementioned is insufficient.  
As such, the author developed a “governmentality hypothesis” to unveil the reasons underlying 
the contra-factual, as well as other cases. The hypothesis posits that the type of political-economic 
model (e.g. planned economy, welfare state, or neo-liberal) of the state in question would explain 
the development or underdevelopment of diaspora policies. In the case of indifferent states, the 
most common political-economic model implemented is the traditional welfare state. In addition, 
characteristics such as an open borders policy, significant fiscal pressures, and partially regulated 
labor markets are found within the “indifferent” cluster of countries (Ragazzi 2014: 86). Yet, 
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scholars have not developed a comprehensive analytical framework to understand these cases at 
the national or subnational level.  
Moreover, since scholars are still trapped into a methodological nationalism approach, there is a 
need for understanding the factors that drive diaspora policies at different levels of analysis. One 
of the few studies that take into account a multi-level analytical approach is the one conducted by 
Délano (2011), where she devoted herself to understand why and how states vary in their approach 
to their diasporas and how they manage migration more in general. Her comprehensive 
methodological approach is evident in the following statement:  
“The reasons why states vary with respect to the degree to which they extend rights, the kind of 
ideology and rhetoric used in relation to emigrants, and the policies or programs that they pursue 
to control or manage emigration can be explained by domestic, transnational, and international 
factors.” (Délano 2011: 10).  
Is in these ways that the emergence of diaspora policies has been studied in different disciplines. 
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE: UNDERSTANDING 
SUBNATIONAL DIASPORA POLICIES 
Globally, local governments are playing a greater role in creating and implementing strategies for 
local development since they have been pushed to compete in the global market (Velázquez 2007) 
within a context of increased interconnectedness. Varsanyi (2010) argues that the “neoliberal 
conduit” or neoliberal globalization has altered the local economic landscape in dramatic and 
differentiated ways. The flexibilization of labor is a response to the model, and cities have had to 
adapt to such scheme. Indeed, the global is increasingly influencing the local and viceversa, 
although this not mean that borders are “waning”. In this respect, the debate about the extent that 
the sovereign power exerted by the state has declined or not has not reached a consensus, with 
some scholars arguing that, indeed, neoliberal globalization, international financial institutions, 
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and fragmented visions of groups coming from below have caused that “key characteristics of 
sovereignty are migrating from the nation-state” to other realms (Brown 2010); and others arguing 
the contrary since the increase in border restrictions on the part of states is evident, which should 
be seen as a natural reflection of the continued prominence of state power (Jones 2016). 
As non-central or local governments are increasingly crossing national borders to reach Non-state 
Actors, the literature on international relations have been developing concepts to understand this 
new trend since this discipline used to focus their analysis on the Nation-state (Gilpin 1986 in 
Ortega 2012; Velázquez 2007). In Latin America, especially in Mexico, Argentina and Brasil, the 
theoretical debate centered in understanding why local governments are acting more prominently 
in the international and transnational arenas has used different concepts such as federal diplomacy, 
paradiplomacy, local diplomacy, constitutive diplomacy, or decentralized international 
cooperation (Ortega 2012; Velázquez 2007; Schiavon 2010). The “confusion”, according to 
Ortega (2012) and Velázquez (2007) is not just conceptual but is also prevalent at the practical 
level since governments are not clear in how to conduct or regulate international policies or actions 
since this has historically been a federal attribution mandated in legal national and international 
frameworks.  
In Mexico, one of the concepts that has been used within the Foreign Ministry (Secretaría de 
Relaciones Exteriores) is federal diplomacy, especially after 2000. The concept was coined by 
Brasil’s Foreign Ministry and it looks to understand international relations of subnational states in 
the context of increased decentralization. This understanding is in line with the United Nations 
concept of decentralized international cooperation which was developed to underscore 
international activities between subnational states in the global scene to potentiate or generate 
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development at the local level in countries of the Global South (Díaz, 2007 and Europa, 2010 in 
Ortega 2012).  
This global strategy has been greatly criticized by scholars such as Márquez (2012) or García 
(2009) among others, since they argue that the political and economic goal of this agenda is to 
implement neoliberal policies with the intention of leaving the problems of development to the 
communities themselves7. States in Latin America have neglected their responsibility as main 
actors in fostering development, delegating the management of its economy to various 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development 
Bank, World Bank, United Nations, to the international financial oligarchy, and to national elites. 
This have brought severe economic crises that resulted in a national as well as an international 
migratory explosion since the 1990s.  
Going back to the discussion about the concepts that have been used to understand foreign relations 
and actions on the part of Mexican states, Ortega (2012) noted that it is the concept of 
paradiplomacy coined by Duchacek (1990 cited in Ortega 2012) and refined in subsequent 
publications that have predominated among most Mexican scholars. However, there is no 
consensus yet from the academy nor is there uniformity in the use of terminology from the Mexican 
government. Mexican state officials have used different concepts besides the federal diplomacy 
concept mentioned above (Ibid). 
Paradiplomacy is defined as the external processes and actions developed among noncentral 
governments or federal states (e.g. counties, municipalities, local governments in general) and 
                                                      
7 Regarding the negative effects of neoliberal policies, in a study on local policy responses to immigration in the U.S., 
Varsanyi (2010) emphasizes the detrimental economic effects of neoliberal policies for both migrants and some sectors 
of the communities where they arrive, finding a nexus between such policies and anti-immigrant backlash. 
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other international actors such as nation-states, local governments, corporations, international 
organizations, among others (Duchacek and Soldatos in Velázquez 2007; Duchacek 1990 in 
Ortega 2012). In addition to the definition, the authors categorized paradiplomatic activities in 
different subconcepts, of which I will highlight two: Regional paradiplomacy and transregional 
paradiplomacy.  
These concepts are relevant to this study and have been used by scholars to understand the external 
activities undertaken by state governments in Mexico emphasizing their geographical location and 
expanding it to include relations between non-state actors and non-central governments. Regional 
paradiplomacy refers to the international activities that different actors undertake between states 
located in border regions. An example of this type of diplomacy are the policies implemented by 
the state of Nuevo Léon through the Centro de Atención a Migrantes (CAM) to manage temporary 
worker programs with visas H2A and private companies in the U.S. (Valenzuela 2007; Ortega 
2012; Hernández-León 2017). With regard to the category of transregional paradiplomacy, it 
includes international relations between non-central states that do not share borders with each other 
but that their central governments do. An example of this are the relations between municipal 
governments in Sinaloa and the HTA called Fraternidad Sinaloense de California, in Los Angeles 
to create development projects in the communities of origin of Sinaloan migrants.  
For these scholars, paradiplomatic relations in Mexico vary depending on a number of domestic 
and international factors such as economic resources of non-central governments, geographical 
location, demographics, political context (e.g. democratization), legal framework, relation with the 
federal government, migratory intensity, global interconnectedness and interdependence, among 
others. Some of these factors coincide with the development of diaspora policies in some Mexican 
states and I use some of them as variables to analyze in coming sections.  
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The international relations conceptual framework is useful to understand global trends on 
international relations and help us to enhance our understanding about the surge in relations 
between NSA and subnational governments from a critical perspective. 
TRANSNATIONALISM 
Transnationalism was defined in 1999 by Portes et al as “the occupations and activities that require 
regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” 
(p. 219). Surpassing the individual level of analysis, Levitt argues that migrants live within 
multiple transnational social fields which include those who stay and those who leave. These fields 
represent a set of multiple set of interconnected social networks in which ideas, practices and 
resources are exchanged, organized, and transformed. Transnational social fields are multi-
dimensional and function in different forms, levels and depth (Levitt 2005).  
The transnational perspective allowed to describe a phenomenon that, although not entirely new, 
has reached unprecedent interest among scholars from different disciplines in the last decades. In 
the case of migration scholars, they have previously focused on migrant’s integration processes, 
neglecting the influence of their linkages with their countries of origin in such analyses.  
From the 1990’s onwards, migration began to be studied from the transnational perspective, which 
has been fundamental for understanding contemporary (and past) migratory processes. Now, the 
increase in the intensity and impact of different flows of people, goods, information and symbols 
becomes clearer due to the transnational lens (Vertovec 2009). What is new now is the intensity, 
speed and efficiency of transnational linkages due to more sophisticate technologies. Thus, despite 
great distances and the existence of international borders between countries, with all the 
restrictions that this entails, certain kinds of relations have intensified globally (Vertovec 2009; 
Moctezuma 2011). 
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However, this perspective has gained criticism and also has generated “mixed feelings” among 
some scholars. For example, if we focus on migrant political transnationalism, some scholars argue 
that transnational political ties could undermine the political and social incorporation of 
immigrants in the U.S. (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Waldinger 2013; Escala et al. 2011), and 
others had gone as far as making similar claims from an anti-Latino/anti-immigrant perspective 
(Huntington 2004 in Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). In a similar vein, Escala et al. (2011) 
argue that it is precisely their transnational philanthropic engagement with their hometowns what 
limits their political, social and civic participation in the U.S. They argue that immigrants are 
already saturated by various obligations, ranging from the family to the workplace; thus, by adding 
more activities to their agendas, their capacity to get involved in political and civic activities is 
considerably reduced.  
Similarly, Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2010) recognize the inherent difficulties that HTAs 
experience in their attempts to engage with their homelands. They show how HTAs are even more 
constrained than mainstream and ethnic organizations in terms of resources and political visibility. 
Nonetheless, they recognize the importance of HTAs in creating spaces that allow disadvantaged 
immigrants to engage in political and/or civic affairs. Such spaces are important at a time where a 
hostile political climate fostered by the new U.S. presidential administration, threatens not only 
their successful incorporation in this country but also its mere permanence in this country. 
There is also a recognition on the exceptionality of these types of engagements, especially the 
political ones. For instance, DeSipio (2011) noted in his study of Latin Americans and Asians that 
only a minority have transnational political ties; rather, they prefer to be engaged in cultural and/or 
social activities with their homelands. These and other scholars are not enthusiastic about the role 
that HTAs can play as transnational political and civic agents.  
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Yet, “pro-transnationalism” scholars have found evidence that do not support the latter argument 
since they have found evidence that shows how immigrant engagement in transnational 
organizations facilitate their incorporation into U.S. society (Fox and Rivera-Salgado, 
Forthcoming; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; DeSipio 2011; Escamilla 2009; Félix 2019). 
While these types of engagements are not representative of the immigrant population overall 
(Waldinger 2013; DeSipio 2011), some organized immigrants have substantially contributed to 
their host and home communities (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). The “optimistic” group of 
scholars highlight the effects of political participation in the host country and the incremental 
consequences on transnational political and civic activities (DeSipio 2011; Escamilla 2009). Then, 
what matters the most in this case is not representativeness but their capacity to create global 
proposals (Moctezuma 2013) and the impact and potential of those proposals for generating social 
change and social justice.  
At the organizational level, the analysis of the transnational processes has not been the focus of 
scholars. It is until recently that transnational studies along with host and sending countries have 
shifted their attention towards the organizational efforts of migrants. One of the reasons that 
propelled this shift relates the increase in remittances and intensity of immigrants transnational 
engagaments with their home countries, which in turn propitiated institutionalized forms of 
political connections of diverse nature (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). There is also some 
evidence showing how transnational immigrant organizations have, for instance, contributed 
substantially to the formation of high-tech growth poles in some cities of China and India (Portes 
and Fernández-Kelly 2016), while Mexican migrants have raised the quality of life of numerous 
families throughout Mexico by sending collective remittances; with or without collaboration with 
the Mexican state (Villegas 2014; García 2009).   
 21 
 
Another body of literature that also explores the organizational activities of immigrants, has 
focused on the different paths they follow on the host society in terms of political participation, 
social incorporation, citizenship acquisition, organizational development and levels of 
transnationalism (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2010; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; Veronis 
2013; Zabin and Escala 2002; Fox and Rivera-Salgado, Forthcoming; Moctezuma 2013). These 
studies have found variation across and within countries, making it difficult to find clear patterns 
among immigrant organizations, even when members of these organizations share language and 
culture.  
Overall, within the literature on transnational organizations, I found no academic consensus 
regarding the consequences of getting actively involved in these types of activities. As Portes and 
Fernández-Kelly (2016) argues, we need to find substantial empirical evidence to shed light on 
this debate. 
From a methodological perspective, transnationalism has evaded what Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
(2002) called methodological nationalism, or the prevalent assumption in social sciences (and in 
other fields) that nations are the basic unit of analysis. Indeed, migration scholars have focused 
overwhelmingly in the states of destination of migrants or “developed immigration countries”, 
leaving aside the analysis of the countries of origin and how both are intrinsically interrelated 
(Délano and Harris 2017).  
The common assumption for leaving the emigration state out of the analysis is that their agency to 
shape migration and migrants’ lives is limited due to the existent asymmetric relationship between 
both states. Scholars have challenged such assumption by showing how diaspora policies and 
diverse actors coming from both states influence the migration phenomenon and how such policies 
assist migrants to integrate them better in their countries of destination (Délano and Harris 2017; 
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Délano 2018; Ortega 2013; Bada 2014; Goldring 2002; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016). Indeed, 
as Délano (2018: 11) argues, this “can be a productive way to move beyond nationalistic 
frameworks (…) to consider different political units (at the local, national, transnational, or 
supranational levels) that can participate more effectively in achieving goals of social justice, 
equality, and democracy.” 
Nonetheless, transnational scholars commonly attributed a weaker role to the state power in 
shaping the lives of immigrants. Until recently, they argued that national states’ sovereignty was 
“waning”, in Brown’s (2010) words, and believed that the tendency would make it irrelevant. 
These scholars attributed a greater role to different groups coming from below and as such, their 
subsequent analysis displaced the relevance of the state. However, since the power exerted by 
states is being evident in actions such as restricting the inclusion of immigrants by virtue of 
granting citizenship just to certain individuals, they have had to rearticulate their position by 
“bringing the state back in” as Délano and Harris (2017: 4) argue. 
From this departure point, I am able to begin exploring gaps in knowledge on the role of emigration 
states −at the state and municipal level− and other actors within it, in shaping the lives of their 
diasporas, their reasons for doing so, and the reactions or involvement of migrants themselves into 
these processes. My research will contribute to the transnational literature in unveiling these 
reciprocal influences between the subnational state, the Sinaloan diaspora, and the communities 
involved.  
SOCIAL NETWORKS, THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES 
AND HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS 
When migrants arrive to the host country through their social networks, they tend to congregate in 
specific communities, giving birth to what Moctezuma (2011a) called daughter communities. 
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Relationships that migrants form are a product of those social networks which serve as a valuable 
resource to someone that arrives in a new or hostile environment (Massey et al 1990). Moctezuma 
(2011) understands social networks as mutual aid networks that serve for exchanging favors, which 
varies depending on the context of origin of the migrant, being rural or urban. Social networks 
could be based on family or kinship, friendship or paisanaje, or the shared identity based in their 
communities of origin (Massey et al 1990; Zabin and Escala 2002), and they represent social 
capital, that is, all the set of formal and informal networks, trust and rules which promote 
cooperation and coordination among members of a group, which are supposed to have mutual 
benefits (Putnam 1993)8. 
Daughter communities precede migrant organizations. These types of communities originate as a 
product of social networks, a territorial referent and a cultura matriótica (matriarchal culture), 
which are reproduced in the community of destination, crystallizing then as a daughter community 
(Moctezuma 2005). While time passes, and migrants have settled, they celebrate different 
festivities and, paradoxically, they also seek new forms of belonging, thus, looking back to their 
communities of origin (Moctezuma 2011).  
EMERGENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS 
Hometown Associations emerge when migrants organize themselves and begin to help their 
communities back home by donating school buses or clothes, or when they carry out social, 
cultural, economic projects and, sometimes, negotiate with governments of the communities of 
origin, and even which those of the destination country to achieve greater impact (Moctezuma 
                                                      
8 It is important to mention that some authors like Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993 quoted by Durand and Massey 
2003), pointed out that social capital could have also negative effects such as discrimination, exploitation or patronage 
practices.  
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2005). Lanly and Valenzuela (2004 quoted by Ibarra 2005, 184) argue that HTAs are created to 
foster a sense of community among migrants and strengthen their cultural ties with their 
communities of origin through different types of works or donations.  
Per Zabin and Escala (2002), the process begins when some migrants with some sort of civic 
consciousness create a leadership committee to represent the daughter community. The authors 
mention how migrants’ attitudes are shaped by what they socialized in their home countries, thus, 
reproducing what was learned back home. Through their habitus, they carry out practices that 
cannot be understood if we do not consider both the context of origin and destination, hence the 
difference in complexity, number and characteristics of HTAs.   
On other occasions, communities or governments of origin request and promote the creation of 
HTAs, which is usually accompanied by a proposal or request that, in a good scenario, will lead 
to the financing of a project in such community. Zabin and Escala (2002) point out the existence 
of such HTAs, most of which are only recognized by their members and do not have formal contact 
with more complex HTAs.  
Another characteristic is that their conformation is predominantly rural, that is, according to 
Massey et al (1987 quoted by Zabin and Escala 2002), immigrants of urban origin do not pertain 
or create HTAs based on their barrio or colonia (neighborhood). Rather, in the case of grouping 
with an HTA, they do so but in the HTAs that represent their father’s hometowns before moving 
to the urban centers.  
There are more complex HTAs compared to those analyzed in the last paragraphs. Moctezuma 
called them “second level” HTAs because they transcend the representation of a single town to 
represent a state, country or even an entire ethnic group, consequently, expanding their scope, and 
bringing together more basic HTAs. However, per Moctezuma (2013), its importance does not lie 
 25 
 
in the number of HTAs grouped but in their greater organizational level and complexity in their 
activities. Itzigsohn (2000 quoted by Moctezuma 2013) points out that quality of these HTAs can 
be noticed when they have more stable and longstanding institutionalized practices between 
immigrants and their social organizations, as well as between the State and its political institutions. 
The Federaciones de Clubes (Federations of clubs) are a good example of a second level HTA. 
However, according to Moctezuma and Pérez (2006), this is not necessarily a linear process where 
all clubs would coalesce or group into a second level HTA after a certain amount of time, rather, 
these types of organizations follow a much more complex process where they can follow multiple 
directions or trajectories. For these authors, the better organized a HTA is, the more political 
influence it can have towards the government of origin.  
3. EVOLUTION OF STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS IN MEXICO 
Since the 1990s, there has been a sustained increase in the development and creation of diaspora 
policies across the world (see graph 1) (Délano 2018; Gamlen et al 2017). Emigration states and 
their populations within them have had gradually changed their perceptions towards migrants, 
transitioning from a perspective that depicted them as “traitors” of the polity to a positive on. Now 
they are being increasingly constructed by most countries as “national heroes” as a way of 
recognizing and understanding the benefits of extending the arms of the state in order to strengthen 
their engagements with the diaspora.  
This shift in the narrative is also true for Mexico. This was the evident when Vicente Fox, former 
president of Mexico (2000-2006), delivered a speech describing Mexican migrants as “heroes 
nacionales” (Délano 2018). Indeed, the trend continues in Mexico as the current director of the 
Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME, Institute of Mexicans Abroad), Roberto 
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Valdovinos, recently used the “heroes” narrative to praise migrants’ contributions to their 
homeland (Domínguez 2019).  
Graph 1. Categorization of Countries with Diaspora Institutions and its Development,  
1980-2014. 
 
Source: Gamlen et al (2017: 3) 
*The graph only show the states that are members of the United Nations.  
Diaspora policies have increased in Mexico at unprecedent levels during the last three decades. 
Beginning in 1987, state-diaspora relations experienced a turn. The Programa de Acercamiento 
del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad Mexicano-Norteamericana marked the beginning of a 
new stage in Mexican State-diaspora relations. The program started in 1987 at the end of the 
presidential term of former Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, however, it was fully 
developed by former Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) (Santamaría 1994). 
The recently created Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) commanded by Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas, represented a strong opposition for the PRI in the 1988 elections. Due to the political 
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inclusive approach of “el ingeniero”9, the “Cardenismo” movement enjoyed a large group of 
supporters on both sides of the border (Ibid). Salinas and his group understood the political threat 
that Cardenismo represented and they responded in an unprecedented way by approaching the 
diaspora and Chicanas/os more proactively.  
Chicanas/os and Mexican immigrants were growing numerically and their political power and 
influence also developed. In the case of Mexicans, the 1986 IRCA agreement granted legal status 
to more than 2 million Mexican immigrants which in turn facilitated transnational organizing 
(Délano 2011: Durand and Massey 2003). Although, it is important to note that the Salinas group 
was interested in strengthening the relationship with Chicano/a leaders more than with Mexican 
immigrants in order to garner their support. For the Salinas group, privileging the relation with 
Chicanos/as was important since they needed their lobbying efforts for supporting the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Santamaría 1994; Délano 2011; Alarcón 2006; 
González 2006; Waldinger 2014; Goldring 2002). Indeed, the instrumental relationship developed 
by the Mexican government probed successful in the approval of NAFTA and for unifying the 
Latino community (González 1993).  
This stage was characterized by a renewed, more active and institutionalized relationship on the 
part of the Mexican state towards its diaspora that crystallized in the creation of several programs 
and policies. These programs were intended to aid Mexican immigrants in the U.S., to protect their 
rights when returning to Mexico, and to strengthen their ties with their home communities and 
governments (Délano 2011, González 2006) with the purpose of sustaining the flow of remittances 
and originated due to the political factors described above. 
                                                      
9 In Mexico, Cárdenas is commonly known by many people as El Ingeniero 
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The first outreach government program was called Programa de las Comunidades Mexicanas en 
el Extranjero (PCME) and it was created in 1989 during the Salinas administration as a response 
to a proposal from organized Chicana/os. It was the first among other outreach programs created 
during this period (Santamaría 1994; Alarcón 2006) and was designed with the purpose of 
developing links between state governments and their emigrants to not lose influence with the 
immigrant community, and to develop projects in mutual collaboration (Lizárraga et al. 2010). The 
Programa Paisano was another program that emerged in recognition and as a response to the 
constant mistreatment and abuse exercised by Mexican government authorities towards their own 
co-nationals who traveled Mexico to visit their communities of origin. Other programs were 
created in coordination with Mexican Federal agencies to provide health or educational services 
to the diaspora and to generate linkages between their own organizations and public or private 
agencies on both sides of the border (González 1993) 
In this way, the emergence of outreach policies intended to establish links with Mexicans and 
Chicana/os in the U.S., is not only explained by economic concerns or pure instrumental interests 
(e.g. interest on remittances on the part of the Mexican state) but also by political and contextual 
external factors such as problems of discrimination and exclusion faced by the Latina/o community 
in both countries (Délano 2011; Alarcón 2006).  
During the two next federal administrations, with president Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI (1994-
2000), and Vicente Fox of the PAN (2000-2006), these outreach policies and interest in increasing 
State-diaspora relations continued, especially under the Fox administration. The creation of the 
PCME in 1990, the Presidential Office for Migrants Abroad (OPME) in 2000, the Instituto de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) in 2003, and the approval of the law that allowed the Mexican 
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vote from abroad in 2007, all were evidence of such changes in the State-Diaspora transnational 
relations.  
Under President Felipe Calderon’s administration (2006-2012), these relations continued, and in a 
way, they were strengthened as a response to anti-immigrant rhetoric and bills against Mexicans 
in the U.S. As evidence demonstrating increased efforts that went beyond the discourse, we can 
see how his administration assigned budget increases to the consulates and media campaigns in 
the US for promoting a better image of Mexican immigrants (Délano 2011 and 2018). Cooperation 
in other matters concerning migration also increased.  
In the case of the administration of former President Enrique Peña (2012-2018), cooperation with 
the U.S. government was more inclined to attend transit migration. In fact, it is well documented 
how the Mexican State developed an ambivalent discourse claiming to be a humanitarian state for 
immigrants fleeing from violence; however, it has systematically violated their rights (Castañeda 
2015; Villegas 2017).  
How do we explain the incremental relationship between the Mexican state and the diaspora in the 
past three decades? In sum, the exponential growth of remittances and migration combined with 
political and economic interests on the part of Mexican state agents; a tight bilateral relationship 
with the United States; demands of migrant organizations and NGOs; and more recently, the 
expansion of state outreach activities to protect migrants as a response to anti-immigrant U.S. 
policies are all factors that allow to better understand an increase in state-diaspora relations at the 
national level according to current literature (Santamaría 1994; Waldinger 2014; Délano 2011 and 
2018; Valenzuela 2007; Bada 2014). 
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3.1. MEXICAN STATES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH DIASPORAS: 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT TRENDS 
In the past two decades, states and municipalities in Mexico started to play an active role in 
different spheres of the public life. Although these changes at the local level were much more 
pronounced at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, Michoacanos 
and Zacatecanos started these types of relationships long ago. In the mid-seventies, the 
transnational Zacatecan community developed a modality which they called “One for One”, 
gathering funds in collaboration with some municipal governments to carry out projects for 
bettering their communities of origin. Their long migration experience, good leadership, a strong 
civil society and the willingness of local governments to collaborate with them, were translated 
into the formation of a new type of public policy (Moctezuma 2011; 2015).  
The “One for One” program evolved to the “Two for One” program in 1993 (Moctezuma 2011) 
with the inclusion of the state government into the design and implementation of development 
projects. According to García (2009), Zacatecans and their local governments financed hundreds 
of basic infrastructure projects. In 1999, the program changed to “Three for One program for 
Migrants” when the three levels of government and migrant HTA’s were collaborating in 
conjunction.  
In general, the Programa Tres por Uno para Migrantes works under a concurrent scheme, that is, 
for every dollar given by the HTA, the government in its three levels (federal, state and municipal) 
complements it with three more dollars. Ideally, each agent contributes with 25% of the 
investment. In practice, this has not been always the case with migrants sometimes contributing 
with 50% and sometimes just “virtually” participating without any economic contribution. The 
program proved to be successful, and in 2002 it was extended to the entire country as a federal 
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program10. It presented a rapid growth and wide acceptance on the part of Mexican HTAs. HTAs 
multiplied across the country along with their contributions and participation with local 
governments11 due to different factors that are not solely attributable to the 3 X 1 Program. The 
federal government had already begun to decentralize their public policies (Velázquez 2007) and 
to liberalize the electoral system, which was a result of social and political demands across the 
country (Verdugo 2009). 
In the case of Michoacanos, they established the first migrant office in Mexico in 1992, and it was 
called the Dirección de Servicios de Apoyo Legal y Administrativo a Trabajadores Emigrantes 
(DSALATE). This office was in charge of providing support to deceased migrants for repatriating 
their bodies to Michoacán as a result of the increase in deaths in their attempt to cross the dessert 
to enter to the United States. A former director of the Instituto Michoacano de los Migrantes en el 
Extranjero stated that the emergence of diaspora policies to serve michoacanos were also a product 
of the pressures and demands of exbraceros (Yrizar and Alarcón 2010). This account shows how, 
in some cases, state-centric explanations for the emergence of diaspora policies are incomplete or 
misguided. Indeed, migrants exert influence vìs-a-vìs their home states governments to implement 
diaspora policies.  
Migrants from different states started to collaborate with municipal and state governments in a 
more frequent manner since 2000’s (Valenzuela 2007). The increased prominence of the states and 
municipalities in Mexico in their approach to their respective diasporas, is part of a larger trend in 
                                                      
10 The impacts of this program will be analyzed in dept in the last chapter with a focus on Sinaloa.  
11 Márquez (2006) argues that the 3x1 was part of a more comprehensive agenda that had the political and economic 
objective of implementing neoliberal policies, with the explicit intention of leaving the problems of development to 
the communities themselves.  
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which the local has been pushed to compete in the global market (Velázquez 2007) within a context 
of “neoliberal globalization” or “neoliberal conduit”, which also has dramatically altered the local 
economic landscape (Varsanyi 2010). Competitiveness led some states and municipal officials to 
engage with migrants abroad to promote culture, tourism, agriculture, services, etc.  
Simultaneously, the federalization or decentralization of power in Mexico strengthened the 
autonomy of states and some cities (Délano 2010 and 2018; Smith 2005; Fitzgerald 2008; Bada 
2014; Burgess 2014; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2016; Ortega 2012 and 2013; Valenzuela 2007; 
Verdugo 2009). Greater autonomy at the local level along with increased competition between 
political parties in Mexico, or democratization, modified their domestic approach to politics. 
Beginning in 1990’s, political elites had to expand their reach by courting their diasporas in the 
U.S., affecting the transnational life of migrants. This happened more markedly in states such as 
Puebla (Smith 2005), Michoacán (Bada 2014), Jalisco (Ortega 2012), or Zacatecas (Moctezuma 
2015; Yrizar and Alarcón 2010).  
Therefore, changes at the international and national levels, affected what happened at the local and 
transnational spheres in Mexico and vice versa. Transnational relations between the diaspora and 
local officials crystalized into diaspora policies at the local level (Velázquez 2007; Ortega 2012), 
mostly in states from the Historical and Central regions.  
3.2. DIASPORA POLICIES IN MEXICO AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL 
Currently, almost all states have established an institute, office, policy or program to coordinate 
and/or foster their relation with Mexican migrants in the U.S., returned migrants or with migrants 
in transit through Mexico (e.g. Migrants from Central America fleeing from violence in their home 
countries). In spite of this, there are few studies that analyze the factors that propel the emergence 
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of diaspora policies at the state and municipal level. Existing studies show important variations in 
terms of institutional capacity or scope of policies directed to the diaspora on the part of 
subnational states (Ortega 2012 and 2013; Vila 2007; Fernández de Castro et al 2007).  
Durand and Massey (2003) argue that Mexican state governments from the “historical region” (see 
Map 1) have developed a stronger relationship with their diaspora due to its massiveness, 
historicity, stability and strong social networks, which in turn have led them to secure the highest 
rates of legalization12 compared to migrants from other regions in Mexico. In fact, U.S. 
immigration policies such as IRCA benefitted mostly Mexican immigrants from the historical 
region, which allowed them to consolidate their networks and strengthen their organizations. In 
turn, higher levels of integration explain the formation of more numerous and institutionalized 
transnational organizational forms, as Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2016) have demonstrated. 
From this departure point, we can see how HTA’s of some states from the historical region such 
as Zacatecas or Michoacan, are in better conditions to put pressures on their governments to create 
policies that take their voices and interests into account (Bada 2014; Moctezuma 2015; Ortega 
2012 and 2013; Vila 2007). Due to these reasons, the historical region has been the focus of 
researchers.  
Other factors proposed by  scholars to explain the emergence of diaspora policies in states from 
other regions include the leadership of some state governors or municipal authorities in response, 
of course, to political, economic or social pressures, or as part of global trends (Délano 2019; 
Fernández de Castro et al 2007; Vila 2007; Ortega 2012). The leadership or initiative of state 
                                                      
12 This region is the most stable in terms of the number of migrants that have been “expulsed” from their communities 
in the past 150 years, and all present high or very high levels of migratory intensity. Migrants from these states have 
developed strong social networks and, because of this, they benefitted extensively from the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act 
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governors or municipal authorities have prompted the creation of policies to support migrants in 
the U.S., to foster the creation of HTA’s, and to take advantage of the collective remittances they 
send to their communities of origin. Jalisco, Yucatan, Morelos or Veracruz exemplify these types 
of cases (Ortega 2012).  
Then, as I have stated, factors that explain the emergence of diaspora policies at the subnational 
level are multidimensional and vary according to the level of analysis (transnational, international, 
national, or local). In fact, because there is a multiplicity of factors that could explain such 
variations, Vila (2007) created a categorization to distinguish state-diaspora relations at the 
subnational level. She used subnational states as her main unit of analysis and found 4 main models 
of government approaches: Active, reactive, managing, and incipient. The first model depends 
greatly on the leadership of state governors to develop programs to support migrants and 
community development programs such as the Programa 3 x 1 para Migrantes. They also 
emphasize the importance of fomenting the creation of HTA’s in the U.S. so that they are able to 
invest in their communities of origin. Jalisco and Yucatán are examples of active state governments 
according to this author. 
Reactive governments are acting in response to pressures on the part of HTA’s such as the ones 
formed of migrants from Zacatecas or Veracruz. HTA’s from these states, specially Zacatecans, 
have exerted influence on their local government to include them as transnational actors in the 
political arena, to collaborate in community development projects, or to create investment projects 
in conjunction with the private sector or international organizations such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
Managing state governments such as Puebla and the State of Mexico are states that manage federal 
programs to potentiate their effects. Programs such as the Programa Paisano Mexiquense and the 
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implementation of the Programa Tres Por Uno are part of the agenda in the latter case. With regard 
to Puebla, López (2005 in Vila 2007) argues that state government engagement has been limited 
to manage federal programs as well. Vila characterize actions implemented by states within this 
category as being limited in their support to migrants, and with clientelist attitudes which erode 
migrant collaboration and trust with their counterparts in Mexico.  
Incipient government approaches to migrants are characterized by states that are beginning to 
recognize their population abroad and that are designing few programs for the diaspora, although 
without resources to implement them.  
Another categorization which is more recent and comprehensive is the one developed by Ortega 
(2012 and 2013). In the most comprehensive study to date on the institutional capacity of Mexican 
states in their transnational relation with their diaspora, Ortega (2012 and 2013) found that 
variations across states are not always explained by variables related to the migratory 
phenomenon13 such as volume and proportion of migrants, or remittances compared to the state 
GDP. She found that other factors are more relevant in explaining the level of state-diaspora 
relations such as the organizational level of HTA’s in the United States and their capacity of 
negotiation vis-à-vis their home state governments; the national political context where some states 
experienced increased party competition; the decentralization of power from the federation to the 
states; and the institutional and political context in the United States (Ortega 2013; Valenzuela 
2007).  
                                                      
13 Ortega (2013) included 6 variables, 4 exogenous (organizational structure of the Oficinas Estatales de Atención a 
Migrantes (OFAM), policies and programs, additional offices located outside of the state and level of international 
relations of state governments) and 2 endogenous (intensity of the migratory phenomenon and number and strength 
of HTA’s).  
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Ortega (2013) also found that there are just four Mexican states were their institutional capacity is 
weak or absent: Sinaloa, Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, and Campeche. The absence of 
diaspora policies or low levels of state-diaspora relations in the latter three states, is explained by 
the instrumental hypothesis since they all have low levels of migratory intensity, low volumes of 
migrants compared to their respective states population, and non-substantial impact of remittances 
to their states economies (as measured by the percentage of remittances compared to the states 
Gross Domestic Product, GDP), thus, they are not “attractive” for state governments. Nevertheless, 
Sinaloa is the exception to the rule. Low levels of diaspora policies directed to Sinaloans in the 
United States are not explained entirely by the instrumental approach. In Chapter five, I provide 
an explanatory framework for understanding this paradigmatic case.  
4. THE SINALOA-CALIFORNIA TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTION.  
Sinaloans have been migrating to the United States even before Mexican migrants from the 
traditional sending states like Jalisco, Michoacán, or Zacatecas14. Sinaloan historian Antonio 
Nakayama argue that the origin of Sinaloan emigration to what is now U.S. territory dates to the 
second half of the eighteenth century, when people from what we now know as the Sinaloan 
municipalities of El Fuerte, Culiacán, Sinaloa, Cosalá, San Ignacio15, and El Rosario settled in 
what is now the state of California16 (Lizárraga et al., 2010). Sinaloan and Sonoran migrants 
allegedly “founded” the town called Nuestra Señora de Los Ángeles Porciúncula in 1781, now 
known as Los Angeles (Nakayama 1980 quoted by Sánchez 2014), the US city where most 
                                                      
14 Durand and Massey (2003) include in this region the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Durango, San Luis 
Potosí, Aguascalientes, Nayarit and Colima. This is also known as the historic migrant-sending region.  
15 Pio Pico, the last Mexican governor of California was born in San Ignacio (Nakayama 1980, quoted by Lizárraga 
2005).  
16 Soldiers from the northern states of Mexico arrived in the region with the purpose of settling in the lands of what is 
known today as California. 
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Sinaloans immigrants live nowadays. Nonetheless, by that time Mexicans were replacing Native 
Indians Gabrielinos, actual founders of the city17, as the main labor force (Estrada 2008).  
After the signing of the Tratado de Guadalupe-Hidalgo in February 2nd, 1848 Mexicans suddenly 
turned into immigrants because the agreements of such treaty, which supposedly provided US 
citizenship to Mexicans living in this territory, were not followed (Sánchez 1993; González 1999 
in Cano and Delano 2007; Chávez-García 2006). Coincidentally, gold was discovered in California 
in the same year18, which in turn attracted Mexicans from states of Northern Mexico such as 
Sonora and Sinaloa, but also from states that were farther south such as Zacatecas.  
The Gold Rush changed the demographics of El Pueblo de Los Angeles so much that a section of 
the city dominated by Mexican immigrants from Sonora was called “Sonoratown” by Anglos 
(Estrada 2008; Sánchez 1993). Los Angeles became “Americanized” by the 1870s, forcing 
Mexican Angelenos (former Californios19) and Mexican immigrants that arrived in thousands 
−mainly from the northern states of Sonora and Sinaloa− to maintain some traditional cultural 
practices and adapt to a harsh environment.  
                                                      
17 El Pueblo de La Reina de Los Angeles del Río Porcíuncula was founded in 1781 by 44 racially mixed arrivers from 
Sinaloa and Sonora and other northern Mexican states, however, Indigenous people inhabited the area long before 
(Estrada 2008; Nakayama 1980 in Lizárraga 2005). According to Estrada (2008), the design of the pueblo envisioned 
by Spanish Governor Felipe de Neve, was not solely based on the Spanish system methods since the Native Indians 
Gabrielinos contributed significantly to the founding and development of the city with their cultural and geographical 
knowledge, and also as a source of labor (Estrada 2008). Through different eliminatory methods (Lytle 2017) and 
because of diseases, Indian population in California drastically declined from 72,050 in 1848 to 12,500 in 1880. Under 
California Law, Indians did not have federal protection. Anglos reasoned that “the quickest and easiest way to get rid 
of [their] troublesome presence was to kill [them] off, [and] this procedure was adopted as a standard for some years.” 
(Estrada 2008: 57).  
18 Approximately 20,000 Mexicans moved to work in the gold mines by that time, however, they were quickly expelled 
by white Anglo settlers (Lytle 2017; Chávez-García 2006; Sánchez 1993). Despite this, such movements represented 
the most significant migration from Mexicans to California compared to other migrations that took place during the 
Spanish and Mexican rules. By 1900, Mexicans living in California represented 7.82 % of the entire Mexican-born 
population that resided in the US (Corwin 1975 in Sánchez 1993).  
19 During Spanish and Mexican rule, inhabitants of California were known as “Californios”. Their decline came right 
after the Tratado de Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the term stopped being used in the 1880s (Estrada 2008).  
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Concentration and segregation of Mexicans in LA or “Barrioization”, was true throughout the 19th 
century but changed during the first four decades of the 20th century. By the latter period, Mexicans 
were scattered along east and central Los Angeles. After World War II, demographic changes and 
racial segregation, which was more pronounced in these years, prompted the emergence of the 
East Mexican side (Sánchez 1993). 
While Mexican migration to California dates back to the 19th century, massive movements began 
in the early 20th century. It was until this period that California gained prominence as a recipient 
of Mexican immigrants due to pull factors such as economic opportunities (e.g. agriculture, mine 
and railroad work) and relaxed federal policies on migration but, more importantly, due to push 
factors in Mexico such as federal policies implemented during the Díaz dictatorship that left 
thousands of peasants without land and jobs; the demographic increase that created a labor surplus; 
the revolutionary upheaval brought by the Revolución Mexicana of 1910; and the new connections 
created by the railway system. Sánchez (1993) complicates Mexico-US migration explanation 
during this period by stating that it went beyond “push-pull” factors, since US corporations that 
controlled the main railroads companies in the US, actively promoted the construction of the 
railroads in Mexico20.  
The majority of Mexican immigrants arriving in Los Angeles during this period were from rural 
communities; small towns in which their inhabitants presented “customary modes of thought and 
behavior and recently arrived examples of machinery and culture”21. This tell us that the culture 
                                                      
20 Along with economic changes, the “Americanization” process that the construction of the railroad system brought 
to Mexico would signify the “modernization” of Mexican Indians, which in turn would have pulled “Mexico into the 
twentieth century” (Sánchez 1993: 22). This logic (“the modernization of the Mexican Indian”) was implemented 
again in 1942 by both US and Mexico states through the creation of the Bracero guest worker program (Loza 2016).  
21 According to Sánchez (1993), most Mexican agricultural towns where different to the ones found in the US during 
that period since   
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brought by Mexican immigrants was not merely “traditional” and/or “static”, as it was portrayed 
by some scholars, but it was a mixture of rural and urban cultures which was characteristic of rural 
Mexico in that period. These Immigrants predominantly came from mid-center Mexican states 
such as Jalisco, Zacatecas, or Guanajuato and from northern states at the border such as Sinaloa, 
Sonora or Chihuahua. An important proportion came also from Mexico City and few from southern 
states22  (Sánchez 1993; Lizárraga 2005). Migrants in L.A. (and in the U.S.) had not developed a 
strong national identity and their racial composition was mestizo/Indian. Some were “acculturated 
Indians”, or Indians who spoke Spanish but practiced some Native and European costumes 
(Sánchez 1993). According to Estrada (2008), differences in terms of class, region of origin and 
race were crucial in the ways Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles differentiated between 
themselves. 
Massive movements of Sinaloans arriving to Los Angeles also started at the first half of the 20th 
century, although with intermittent cycles in which Sinaloan emigration has increased and 
declined. A critical event would mark the future of Sinaloa in different and complicated ways. 
During the 1970s, the Mexican government started Operación Cóndor, one among other 
governmental attempts to eradicate drug trafficking. The program mainly targeted Sinaloa23, but 
also Durango, Chihuahua (the so-called Triangulo Dorado, Golden Triangle) and Guerrero, and 
prompted a wave of violence mainly affecting the rural communities located in the mountains of 
El Triangulo. This would lead to the displacement of large contingents of people to other 
                                                      
22 It is relevant to highlight distinctions between regions or states of origin of Mexicans since, contrary to popular 
ethnocentric assumptions among most US scholars, there are important variations among Mexicans in terms of race, 
class and culture. For instance, states at the northern region such as Sonora or Chihuahua had the highest literacy rates 
in the country and lower gender disparities compared to states from the center or the south such as Michoacán or 
Guanajuato (Sánchez 1993). 
23 Sinaloa is the birthplace of drug trafficking in Mexico, which dates to the 1910s (Valdéz 2017).   
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municipios within Sinaloa, to other states in Mexico, and to the U.S. (Valdez 2017, Lizárraga 2005, 
Lizárraga et al 2010). Later, during the 1980s and 1990s, violence would continue in Sinaloa 
which, along with various economic crises24, caused massive expulsion of people. As one of the 
consequences, some localities disappeared altogether.   
As a result of exacerbated violence and economic hardships (81 % migrated for this reason), a 
significant proportion of Sinaloans emigrated to the U.S. It is indeed a strategy for improving their 
income but also a survival strategy since violence in the mountain region or la sierra, originated 
by organized crime and the military, has increased migration from these areas (Lizárraga et al 
2010; López 2017).  
CONTEMPORARY SINALOAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
Currently, Sinaloan emigration to the U.S. compared to emigration from other Mexican traditional-
sending states is moderate. The accumulated number of Sinaloan immigrants living in the U.S. 
amounts to 239,620 people, but only taking into account the 1990-2013 period. This figure 
represents 2% of Mexicans residing in the U.S. in 2013, however, if we add the 2nd and 3rd 
Generation Sinaloans, the number would double or triple. Moreover, these estimates do not 
consider undocumented Sinaloans which represent around 59 % of the total (Lizárraga et al. 2010). 
More recent figures show that Sinaloans represented 1.6% of all Mexican migrants in the U.S., 
although this percentage is not accurate representation since it is based on Matrículas consulares, 
which is a document that Mexican consulates provide to migrants in need of some sort of 
identification (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). Most migrants do not need or acquire matrículas.  
                                                      
24 According to Granados (2005), from 1982 to 1995, Mexico was affected by several economic crises which damaged 
Sinaloa to a greater extent.  
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To have a better sense of the intensity of Sinaloan migration compared to Mexican migrants from 
other states, the Consejo Nacional de Población (National Population Council) created a measure 
called Migratory Intensity index (MII). This measure integrates four variables: Households 
receiving remittances; households with migrants in the U.S.; households with circular migrants; 
and households with returned migrants. In this sense, the MII index for Sinaloa position the state 
in the 23rd place at the national level with a medium level of Migratory Intensity (CONAPO 2012).  
Due to the historical connection with California, the vast majority of Sinaloans decide to emigrate 
to the Golden State (52 %), and a lower proportion to Arizona (28 %). However, similar to migrants 
from other Mexican states, they are increasingly moving or arriving to other states like Illinois, 
Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, Idaho or North Carolina25 (Lizárraga et al. 2010). In a 
similar vein, Serrano (2016) noted that Sinaloans are concentrated mainly in California and 
Arizona, however, he found that the first state accounts for almost 70 % of Sinaloans, while 
Arizona, Nevada, Texas and Utah have less than 7 % of Sinaloans each26.   
Sinaloans concentrate in specific localities due to their social networks, as most Mexicans 
immigrants do. Per Ibarra (2004), their main destination within California is the city of Los 
Angeles, representing 21 % of Sinaloans living in the U.S. Other preferred destinations are San 
Francisco, Stockton (Lizárraga et al. 2010), Victor Valley (García 2005 quoted by Montoya 2008) 
or Pasadena (Pintor 2014).  
However, due to the current hostile context for Latina/o migrants, Sinaloans are disproportionally 
affected by anti-immigrant policies implemented by the current administration. Sinaloans deported 
                                                      
25 This phenomenon is not particular to Sinaloans since the destinations of Mexicans in general have diversified in the 
last decade (Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005, Massey 2008).  
26 Is important to note that Serrano (2016) only considers migrants that are actually registered in the consulates, thus, 
greatly reducing representativeness.   
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by U.S. immigration authorities represent 4.6% of the entire number of Mexican migrants deported 
in 2017 (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). This tell us that Sinaloans are a highly vulnerable population 
compared to other Mexicans in the U.S. 
The places of origin of Sinaloan migrants who left their home communities to settle in L.A. are 
the municipalities of Culiacán, Mazatlán, Mocorito, Guasave and Ahome (Ibarra et al., 2004). 
Considering not only Los Angeles but the U.S. in general, Serrano (2017) found that, within 
Sinaloa, these municipalities are the same ones that have more migrants abroad with the majority 
emigrating from Culiacán (30.6%), Guasave (11%), Ahome (10%), Mazatlán (10%) and Mocorito 
(5%). However, if we use the 2010 Absolute Migration Intensity Index (IAIM), the four 
municipalities that have the highest levels of MII are Elota 3.50 (medium), Choix 3.39 (medium), 
Mocorito (3.33), and San Ignacio (medium) (Serrano 2017). On the other side, the three 
municipalities with lowest levels in the same year but according to CONAPO (2012) are Angostura 
(very low), Mazatlán (very low) and Concordia (low). 
Family Remittances  
Sinaloans send family remittances that are very important to the households that receive them. In 
2018, they sent $797 million USD, the highest amount received to date (BANXICO 2018). In 
2016, for instance, the state received $620 million USD, which represented 2.3% of the total share 
at the national level, placing Sinaloa in the 17th place. In that year, Sinaloans sent the largest 
amount of remittances in the history of the entity, yet these resources are still increasing. In terms 
of the percentage of households receiving family remittances, in 2016 Sinaloa was ranked 13th 
nationally since 4.8% of Sinaloan households received remittances. For these households, 
remittances represented 17.7% of their income (Serrano and Jaramillo 2018). There is no doubt 
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that migradolares are an important source of income for the families that receive them, and they 
have multiplier effects for the economy in general.  
At the municipal level, Culiacán (39%), Guasave (13%), Ahome (12%), and Mazatlán (11.5%) are 
the municipalities that received the largest amount of family remittances in 2016, with 462.6 
million USD, which represents 75 % of the state total (see Graph 3). However, if we consider the 
proportion of households receiving remittances, Cosalá, Mocorito and Elota are the municipalities 
that were most dependent on remittances in 2010 with 9.20%, 8.49% and 8.17% respectively.  
Graph 2. Sinaloa: Family remittances, 2003-2018 (USD, millions) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from BANXICO 2019. 
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Graph 3. Sinaloa: Remittances per Municipality, 2017 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from BBVA/CONAPO (2019). 
4.1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SPHERE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF 
MEXICAN AND SINALOAN HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS 
Immigrants from different countries have formed organizations across the world and for a variety 
of reasons. The diversity in their forms of organizing have also varied depending on factors such 
as country of origin, historical period, ethnicity, race, political objectives, among others. For 
instance, countries in the Global North have their own immigrant organizations as is the case of 
France, or Spain where immigrants from Mali, Senegal and Ecuador have formed their owns HTAs 
to aid their communities of origin (Daum 1995; Lavigne-Delville 2000 quoted by Beauchemin and 
Schoumaker 2009; Lacomba 2016).  
Countries in the Global South also have their own migrant associations as Beauchemin and 
Schoumaker (2009) called them. These author’s research shows how immigrants and domestic 
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migrants living in West African countries like Burkina Faso or Ivory Coast contribute to the 
development of their communities of origin. In the case of Latin Americans, it. Is also natural form 
them to create organizations and they have done so all over the world. For instance, Lacomba 
(2016) showed how Ecuadorian immigrants created transnational organizations in Madrid, Spain 
and in New York City, to engage in political matters in both their home and destination countries.  
In the U.S., immigrants from a wide range of countries have formed different types of 
organizations such as religious congregations, soccer clubs, migrant clubs and federated 
Hometown Associations (HTA’s), unions, among others (Fox and Bada 2008). These 
organizations vary with respect to their historical roots, type of actions, objectives and 
organizational level. In the case of HTAs, which is one of my units of analysis, they have become 
the most common type of organization among Mexicans, Salvadorians and Guatemalans since the 
late 1990s (Escala et al. 2011, Rivera-Salgado et al. 2005).  
Currently, Mexican HTAs represent the largest and most extensive organizational form among 
first-generation Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (Zabin and Escala 2002; IME 2017). At the 
subnational level, immigrants from Guanajuato, Jalisco, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Zacatecas −states 
from the historic migrant-sending region per Durand and Massey (2003) regionalization− have the 
largest number of HTAs. If we focus on Sinaloan immigrants, they also have created HTAs, 
varying in amount and organizational levels. Hence, if we want to be able to understand why they 
have formed different type of organizations, what is their current state, their interactions and 
transnational dynamics vis-à-vis their home states and governments, we need to delve into the 
historical roots of Mexican HTA’s in L.A. For that matter, in the following subsection I provide a 
non-traditional account of the origins of HTA’s in the city of Angels.  
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THE ORIGINS OF IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: A NON-
TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT 
It is true that contemporary HTAs are different from their predecessors in different ways, they 
have evolved and adapted depending on different factors attributable to the context of origin and 
destination in which they were created. However, regular understandings of Mexican HTAs depict 
them as completely new forms of transnational engagements (Iskander 2016).  
Some trace their historical roots to the 1960’s in South California where they incipiently began to 
organize to support sick, injured or deceased migrants (García 2007 and 2009; Goldring 2004). 
Vega (2004) traced its origins to the 1970’s when they begin to organize soccer clubs which later 
on evolved into philanthropic organizations such as the HTAs that are more common nowadays. 
Others like Moctezuma (2005), trace their origin to the 1920s, however, those organizations where 
naturally distinct to current HTAs. For this author, such discrepancies tell us that immigrant 
organizations are older and more diverse than is normally accepted or believed.  
Indeed, we can trace back their origins to the 19th and 20th Century, where Mexican and Chinese27 
immigrants formed organizations known as mutualistas, hui guan or tongxiang hui (mutual aid 
societies). Excluded from the possibility of entering into U.S. unions, Mexican immigrants found 
organizing alternatives to protect themselves (Gómez-Quiñones 1994 in Cano and Delano 2007). 
Continued social exchanges at public spaces such as the Plaza fostered their creation. Mutualistas 
                                                      
27 During the late 19th century, more than 75,000 Chinese immigrants lived in the US, of which the majority resided 
in California. Indeed, Native Indians were being replaced by the Chinese. As a result of an economic crisis known as 
the “Panic of 1873” and the increase of Chinese immigrants, Anglos implemented different laws in order to restrain 
their mobility and to exclude them from the nation. A preeminent Chinese HTA was the Chinese Consolidated 
Benevolent Association (CCBA), mostly known as the Six Companies. In Los Angeles, the CCBA was established in 
1889, after the creation of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, and it was comprised of 27 smaller organizations. As a 
response to the exclusion Act, they enacted a massive disobedience campaign, which is considered to be the first 
movement for immigrant rights in the U.S. history (Lytle 2017; Zhou and Lee 2016; Faragher 2016).  
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served as a form of protection since the arrival environment was adverse for them, they helped to 
some extent to achieve better socioeconomic conditions, to strengthen cultural ties, and to serve 
their communities of origin (Gonzalez 1990 in Iskander 2016; Lytle 2017; Faragher 2016; Patiño 
2017; Zhou and Lee 2016; Sánchez 1993; Cano and Délano 2007). 
Mexicans experimented violence as a product of exclusionary laws28 and forming mutualistas can 
be conceived as an act of resistance since they were excluded from unions. A sense of solidarity 
had to be constructed to challenge Anglo discrimination and violence, and this organizations 
challenged the system in different ways. Mexican mutual-aids organizations embraced Mexican 
history and used it to provide them with identity. Nationalistic as they were (as many current 
Mexican HTAs are), some mutualistas constrained their membership to Mexican born individuals; 
yet others were open to include Mexican Americans or non-Mexicans29 (Cano and Delano 2007; 
Patiño 2017; Sánchez 1993). Similar to the activities that some current HTAs still perform, 
mutualistas helped families to return the remains of their deaths to their home communities30 and 
provided health and legal support, as well as recreational services (Cano and Delano 2007). This 
is why “undesirable” immigrants have had a long organizing history in Los Angeles and it may 
also help to explain why Los Angeles is the leading city in the fight for spatial and social justice 
                                                      
28 U.S. settler colonial practices resulted in exploitation, marginalization and, in some cases, extermination of native, 
indigenous, blacks, immigrants and any other undesirable group since the very foundations of the country. This is 
particularly true to Los Angeles, since there exist a documented history in which westward expansion of U.S. Anglo 
settlers during the second half of the 19th century, driven by the Manifest Destiny ideology, performed criminal and 
punishment acts among other methods such as incarceration, the implementation of a property regime or 
biological/cultural assimilation, towards natives (Tongva-Gabrielinos), indigenous, Mexican mestizos, blacks, Asians 
and people of color in general, with the main purpose of seizing their lands and allocating resources to the benefit of 
the “white Anglo settler” (Nakano 2015; Lytle 2017; Faragher 2016).  
29 Organizations such as the Congreso de Pueblos que Hablan Español was one of the first organizations that addressed 
problems of both communities, along with the struggles of other groups such as Filipinos or the Japanese (Patiño 
2017; Sánchez 1993). 
30 For a full ethnographic account of these acts, see “Specters of Belonging”, in which Félix (2019: 140) use the 
concept of “transnational afterlife” to “understand Mexican migrant’s cultural politics of mourning and the making of 
a posthumous transnational tradition. 
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(Soja 2014). Therefore, mutualistas are the original predecessors of the transnational Hometown 
Associations which are known in Mexico as Clubes de migrantes or Clubes de oriundos (Gutiérrez 
1999 in Cano and Delano 2007).  
Another type of transnational organization created by Mexicans in the U.S. were called the Juntas 
or Sociedades Patrióticas, also known as Juárez Clubs. These clubs were created with political 
and revolutionary purposes, however they also dedicated time to organize cultural and recreational 
activities such as beauty contests and Mexican festivities. Because they were eminently political 
organizations, the Sociedades Patrióticas had close ties with the Mexican state (Cano and Delano 
2007). 
During the 1920s and 1930s, legal violence31 on the part of the U.S. enhanced the prominence of 
Mexican immigrant organizations such as labor unions and mutualistas, but other organizations 
also emerged. The Clubes Liberales, Juntas Constitucionales, the Comisiones Honoríficas 
(Honorary Committes) and the Brigadas de la Cruz Azul (Blue Cross Brigades) were created to 
address injustices and inequalities and to promote Mexican culture or Mexicanidad for 
strengthening their ties with their communities of origin in collaboration with Mexican consulates 
(Cardoso 1982; Corwin 1978; González 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007; Patiño 2017; Ngai 2005). 
Patiño (2017) calls such acts of resistance as encuentros, which where practiced by the Mexican 
community and Mexican authorities to device collective solutions to the exclusionary policies and 
practices on the part of the U.S.  
In Los Angeles, ethnic diversity and class divisions were part of the city environment. Since many 
participated in the Mexican Revolution (Estrada 2008), they used their political skills within the 
                                                      
31 Menjívar and Abrego (2012) understand legal violence as the kind of violence that results from and is made possible 
through implementation of law.  
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organizations that were already in the city. The Plaza de Los Angeles was the central space for 
gatherings and meetings of Mexican immigrants and their associations.  Organizations created in 
L.A. such as the Confederación de Sociedades Mexicanas (CSM) and the Confederación de 
Uniones Obreras Mexicanas (CUOM), advocated for worker rights in collaboration with the 
Mexican consulate and the Mexican based Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (Patiño 
2017; Gutiérrez 1999 in Cano and Delano 2007).  
Hometown Associations similar to some that are still functioning nowadays emerged in the 1960s. 
As it was argued before, they enacted similar forms of support towards their communities of origin 
and contributed along with local authorities from their communities of origin in order to improve 
them. However, Gómez-Quiñones (1983 in Cano and Delano 2007) describe this period as one in 
which the collaboration between the Mexican state and organized Mexicans in the U.S. was weak. 
Currently, HTAs are the largest and most extensive organizational form among first generation 
Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (IME 2017; Zabin and Escala 2002) and they are found in global 
cities such as Los Angeles or New York, and in smaller cities such as Salem or Woodburn in 
Oregon (Stephen 2007). Within the Los Angeles region we can find the largest number of HTAs 
throughout the U.S. 
Moctezuma (2013) argues that all Mexican states have an HTA in the U.S., although not all are 
formally registered, and they differ in terms of their level of organization and scope. The reasons 
for such asymmetries are still unclear and there is no consensus among transnational scholars. 
What makes even more difficult to understand such variations is the lack of sources providing 
systematic data on HTAs because of the reasons mentioned above. Nonetheless, the IME has the 
largest existing database which registers different types of Mexican immigrant organizations 
across the world. This database shows that immigrants from the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
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Guerrero, Oaxaca and Zacatecas have formed the largest number of HTAs. These states have 
developed mature migratory circuits that in turn have resulted in the creation of large migrant 
communities which are the base for the creation of HTAs. A strong migrant entrepreneurship is 
also an expression of strong immigrant communities (Moctezuma 2015) 
At the organizational level, among the HTA’s that are more transnationally active and complex 
we find the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California (FCZSC), The Federación 
Internacional de Zacatecanos en Los Angeles,  the Federación de Clubes Unidos Zacatecanos en 
Illinois (FCUZ) the Federación de Clubes Michoacanos en Illinois (FCMI), the Clubes Unidos 
Guerrerenses del Medio Oeste (CUGMO), the Federación de Clubes de Guerrerenses radicados 
en Chicago (FCGC), the Federación de Clubes Jaliscienses en el Sur de California (FCJSC) and 
the Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales (FIOB).  
Of the above, the oldest and the most developed for a long time was the Zacatecan FCZSC, which 
served as an example for migrant organizations due to their numbers, higher organizational 
development, political power, transnational engagement in the projects developed, and a “strategic 
transnational leadership” (Moctezuma 2013 and 2015: 50). Moctezuma (2003 quoted by Pintor 
2014) argues that is mainly because Zacatecans used to have the largest number of HTAs in the 
U.S., the most advanced organizational development, and due to the synergy created by 
governmental programs like the Programa Tres por Uno para Migrantes (Three for One Program 
for Migrants) that emerged as a result of the initiative of Zacatecan organized immigrants32. 
Up to this point, it is worth to define collective remittances and to distinguish their types. 
Moctezuma and Pérez (2006: 125) define them as a¨ savings fund that HTA´s use to the creation 
                                                      
32 In the last chapter, I analyze the 3 x 1 Program at the national, state and municipal level and its specific implications 
regarding transnational engagement of Sinaloans and the Mexican state.  
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of projects that benefit the community, and a resource that obliges negotiation with different levels 
of government, allowing the realization of projects that remain historically underdeveloped¨33. The 
authors differentiate collective remittances between formal and informal ones. The former ones 
are those where the state and HTAs participate conjointly regardless which level of government is 
engaged. The latter ones are those were HTAs participate without direct government interference. 
Because the focus of my study is to understand state-diaspora relations, I focus on formal collective 
remittances, although it is very important to acknowledge that an uncountable amount of informal 
collective remittances is sent by HTAs in Sinaloa and Mexico. We still don’t have an estimate of 
these resources. 
SINALOANS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES 
One of the first Sinaloans HTAs, if not the first, is the Club San José which is based in Los Angeles, 
California, and was created in 1979 by a group of immigrants from the locality of Agua Verde, a 
small rural coastal town with a little more than five thousand inhabitants and belonging to the 
municipality of Rosario, Sinaloa. In this case, it was the initiative of the parish of the town, and 
not the migrants, who asked for funds to build a church, which is why the HTA bears the name of 
the patron saint of the locality (Pintor 2014). 
This was one among many philanthropic actions undertaken by the Club San José in support of 
their community. Through donations and collective remittances, they engaged in several 
transnational actions and contributed to community development with the participation of the local 
                                                      
33 Personal translation: Las remesas colectivas constituyen dos cosas: un fondo de ahorro que las asociaciones de 
migrantes destinan a la realización de proyectos de beneficio comunitario, y un recurso que obliga a la negociación 
con los distintos niveles de gobierno, permitiendo la realización de obras comunitarias que permanecen como rezago 
histórico.  
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inhabitants and, in some cases, collaborating with the government. Javier Benítez, one of the 
founding leaders of this HTA, developed links with a U.S. based NGO called All Saints, which is 
part of the Baptist Churches. This coalition made it possible to carry out several philanthropic 
actions in Agua Verde. Due to their success and good experiences, the Club San José obtained 
recognition and prestige, and according to Renato Pintor, it laid the foundations for the creation of 
the only federation of Sinaloan clubs that have ever existed, the Fraternidad Sinaloense de 
California34 (Ibid). Nonetheless, the successful transnational process that began in Agua Verde is 
now eroded. This community does not receive collective remittances from the San José Club 
anymore, and almost all the projects are abandoned. (Personal conversations with members of the 
community of Agua Verde (Pintor 2014). What happened in Agua Verde reflects also the erosion 
of the transnational process at the state level35. 
Another experience where organized Sinaloan migrants, the local community, and municipal, state 
and federal authorities worked together, happened in El Rosario, the main city in the municipality 
that bears the same name, and in Los Angeles. It all started in 1983, when Luis Villegas Murguía36, 
a prominent citizen of El Rosario, along with “Conchita” Aragón de Cobb who was living in L.A., 
worked together to raise funds in Los Angeles with the aim of building a recreational park in El 
Rosario. Villegas recalls that the municipal president or major of the town did not have enough 
funds to finish the park, and he thought (Mr. Villegas) that through the creation of an HTA in L.A., 
they could collect enough money to finish it. Conchita did the difficult task of contacting and 
organizing a big event on the day of the Virgen del Rosario, which is the Patron Saint of the town 
                                                      
34 The transnational dynamics of the FSC will be explored in depth in a subsequent section.  
35 I will explain the reasons of this decline in the last chapter 
36 Luis Villegas Murguía,  interview by Fernando Villegas, October 2013, personal records.   
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and an important day for migrants. It was a complete success. Between 200 and 300 migrants 
attended, and they were not only able to collect the necessary funds for finishing the park, but they 
also created the club El Rosario, in which Conchita served as the first president and Luis Villegas 
was declared first honorary life president.  
With the creation of the club many other donations came, being a nursing home the main project 
in which migrants collaborated along with subsequent municipal governments. Even the federal 
government collaborated with funds for the nursing home. Mr. Villegas mentioned how the former 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari congratulated them and authorized federal funds for 
the project37. Currently, the organization still exists but it is not active since their members have 
aged and their children are not interested in sending collective remittances per Villegas account. 
He also mentioned that experiences of corruption on the part of the municipal authorities made 
them distrust and decided to stop collaboration with municipal officials. This experience could be 
one of the first transnational actions in Sinaloa in which organized migrants, the state at different 
levels, and the local community collaborated.  
An important episode in the history of Sinaloan HTAs that has not been written until now is still 
living in Villegas memories. After being major of El Rosario, he remembers being contacted by 
his friend, Jose Angel Pescador, who was at that time Consul General in Los Angeles. Pescador 
knew about Villegas`s work with Sinaloan HTAs and was interested in fostering these linkages in 
order to create more HTAs and unify existing ones. In fact, as a result of Pescador’s initiative, and 
Villegas’s and “Conchita’s” organizing skills and contacts with migrants in L.A., they helped to 
                                                      
37 For understanding the underlying political motivation of Salinas de Gortari see Chapter 3.  
 54 
 
create the first Sinaloan federation of clubs that coalesced HTAs from different municipalities and 
villages from the state: La Fraternidad Sinaloense de California.  
LA FRATERNIDAD SINALOENSE DE CALIFORNIA 
I was invited by José Ángel Barajas, current President of the FSC, to have lunch in his preferred 
restaurante in Montebello, California. While having lunch, we started to talk about different 
topics. Barajas was born in Mazatlán, Sinaloa and came to the U.S. when he was a teenager. He 
has been part of the FSC for more than 17 years. In 2000 he was the 2nd Vice-President of the FSC, 
when Octavio Barrón was the President. He mentioned his perception on the number of Sinaloans 
in California, which according to him amount to more than 700,000. We also talked about the 
subject of which most Sinaloans speak, el Narcotráfico and how it has affected the FSC. He 
mentioned that an internationally recognized drug trafficker, who was close to “El Chapo” 
Guzmán, was president of the FSC for a time. By that time, he recalls, many left the fraternidad. 
Now, the FSC has been recovering and it has a membership of approximately 8000 individuals. 
Almost nothing has been researched about the FSC within academia, and there are limited data 
from other sources as well. We know that it was created in 1991 and it is based in Los Angeles. It 
was founded by Sinaloans Jose Ángel Pescador Osuna and Humberto Gálvez. The former was 
Consul General of Mexico in Los Angeles by the time the FSC was founded, and Secretary of 
Public Education at the federal level in Mexico. Gálvez is founder of Pollo Loco Restaurante, a 
well-known fast food chain that began in Sinaloa, México and now has several branches in Los 
Angeles. In an interview with Mario Cárdenas, member of the FSC board, Director of Plaza 
México in Los Angeles, and former president of the Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en 
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Norteamérica (COFEM, Council of Mexican Federations in North America)38, he mentioned how 
important Pescador Osuna was for promoting the formation of HTAs, not only for Sinaloans but 
for Mexicans in general. He recalled that the FSC was the most important HTA among all HTAs 
by that time, due to Pescador’s influence in conjunction with the work of other leaders such as his 
brother, who was the former president of the Sinaloan Club Bamoa, from the municipality of 
Guasave, Sinaloa.    
MARIO. Sinaloa had a very great boom when my brother was [a member] (…) and [because] 
Pescador Osuna (…) was one of the promoters of these type of organizations. He [Pescador] was 
one of the greatest drivers [of the organization] and not only the one from Sinaloa but also for the 
rest [of the organizations from other states].39 
The information regarding the importance of the FSC due to Pescador’s work was corroborated in 
different interviews with leaders in both Sinaloa and Los Angeles. For instance, in my interview 
with José Angel Barajas, current President of the FSC, he recognizes the role of the Mazatlecan40 
as one of the founders of the Fraternidad. Villegas Murguía also mentioned how Pescador was 
organizing migrants in L.A. during his time as Consul General and how different Sinaloan state 
governors and internationally recognized artists from Sinaloa such as Lola Beltrán, regularly 
attended the events organized by the FSC. Among the state governors that attended to the events 
organized by the FSC were Antonio Toledo Corro, Francisco Labastida, Renato Vega, Juan S. 
Millán, and more recently, Mario López Valdéz. Another source that corroborates how the FSC 
had a prominent role among Mexican HTAs in the U.S., is a message written by José Luis Bernal, 
                                                      
38 COFEM is a non-profit organization that groups the largest number of second-level HTAs and organizations from 
different countries.  
39 Own translation from Spanish to English. Parenthesis indicate deliberate omission of information provided by the 
interviewed person, and which I considered non-relevant to the topic and/or confusing.   
40 Mario Cárdenas and José Ángel Barajas (FSC current main leaders), interview by Fernando Villegas, May 2017, 
personal records.   
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former Consul General of Mexico in 2000. In a letter addressed to the FSC, he stated: “The 
Fraternidad Sinaloense has always distinguished itself for being one of the Mexican home town 
associations with greater vigor and unity” (FSC Magazine 2000, 7)41.  
José Angel Pescador Osuna is certainly, one of the most influential figures for understanding not 
only the emergence of the FSC but also to elucidate how the broader federal agenda was 
implemented simultaneously in both Sinaloa and Los Angeles and how impacted locally and 
transnationally. As major of Mazatlán (1987-1989), General Consul of Los Angeles in two periods 
during the 1990s and having worked in different positions during Salinas de Gortari’s 
administration, he provided crucial information to my study. According to Pescador’s account, 
forming the FSC was “completely” his idea, “even the name” since he was part of a social group 
which included the word Fraternidad in its name. He recalls how the successful experience of 
Zacatecan’s HTAs served as a model and thought it was possible to draw on that experience to 
create Mexican HTAs all over the country, especially in L.A. He was committed to create the first 
Sinaloan federation following the example of the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de 
California (FCZSC), and convened to a first meeting at his home in L.A. at the beginning of 1990: 
The first meeting was at my home. I invited between 30 and 40 persons and everyone 
attended. We were in the courtyard, and I raised the idea of organizing again, as Sinaloans 
did in the past, through specific organizations (…)42 
The meeting was successful and two weeks later Pescador convened a second formal meeting at 
the consulate. Sinaloan leaders and entrepreneurs attended, and some of them served as presidents 
of the FSC. The first president was Humberto Gálvez, a successful Sinaloan entrepreneur, the 
                                                      
41 Personal translation: “La Fraternidad Sinaloense siempre se ha distinguido por ser una de las organizaciones de 
oriundos mexicanos con mayor vigor y unidad.” 
42 Jose Ángel Pescador, unpublished data, August 9th, 2018.  
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second was Javier Benítez, and the third Octavio Barrón. Pescador mentioned that after Barron’s 
term, the FSC started to decline, although it was very successful at the beginning as other of my 
interviewees have highlighted. They also created between eight and eleven HTAs from different 
Sinaloan municipalities for the purpose of having organized migrants to receive Mexican state 
governors and officials instead of U.S. entrepreneurs and government officials.   
Per Pescador’s account, Sinaloan state and municipal officials, and Sinaloan migrants were very 
active at that time, more than state officials and migrants from most Mexican states, and he 
explains the effervescence due to different factors of which he highlights the following: His role 
as General Consul due to his regional identity as Sinaloan, which probed beneficial in 
strengthening Sinaloan migrant-led organizations and supporting the Sinaloa diaspora through 
consular services; the role of Sinaloan governors, especially Francisco Labastida’s (1987-1992) 
support to the diaspora and leadership to bring municipal presidents together (all from the PRI 
party). Labastida was especially supportive compared to other governors. He provided resources 
for organizing events and invited recognized characters of different political, economic and artistic 
circles from both Mexico and the U.S., although there was no support for business projects. At the 
meso and organizational level, the competition between municipal governments and HTAs to bring 
funds to their respective communities; and at the macro level, the federal electoral competition due 
to Cardenismo since consulates where strengthened “to balance [political] forces”43.   
 
 
                                                      
43 On this latter factor see chapter 3 and Bada (2014: 88) for an account of the first experiences of using federal funds 
and linking states with migrants in order to build community projects through the federal program PRONASOL’s 
International Solidarity funds. According to Bada, this was the first time that SEDESOL worked along state 
governments and migrants to finance codevelopment projects.  
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Image 2. FSC leaders and Luis Donaldo Colosio, Former Mexican Secretariat of Social 
Development  
 
Source: Mexicanidad magazine (1993)44.  
The decline of the FSC, and Sinaloan HTAs, will come after Pescador ended his second term as 
Consul General. He provided some explanations that explains the “dismemberment” of the 
organization which are worth noting. First, the lack of interest of state governors in continuing the 
relationship with the diaspora with the exception of Governor Francisco Labastida. Second, the 
poor work with the communities of subsequent Consuls. “Political consuls” were replaced with 
professional consuls, leaving the communities behind; with the exception of Carlos González who 
has published books an article focused on state-diaspora relations. Third, a weak leadership within 
the FSC who have not achieved the economic and political contacts needed for strengthening the 
organization. Pescador argues that “the FSC does not exist right now. I acknowledge that they have 
kept the name (…) but it gained a very bad reputation. At least they provided a decent perception 
of Sinaloans”.  
                                                      
44 One year after this picture, Luis D. Colosio was assassinated when he was running for the Presidency of Mexico as 
a candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) (Loaeza and Prud’homme 2010).   
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Currently, the Fraternidad has a 501c3 non-profit status, which was acquired in 1994 (Barajas 
2017; FSC Magazine 2016) and has no political affiliation. As their main objective, the FSC thrives 
to be a “important catalyst” to improve the living standards of their places of origin. For example, 
the FSC HTAs have supported their communities in Sinaloa through various works such as the 
construction of libraries, churches, nursing homes, donation of ambulances, school buses, 
scholarships, medical equipment, help in emergency situations such as natural disasters, equipment 
for the disabled, the construction of electrification and water plants, roads, among many others. At 
the same time, this HTA has functioned as an organizational support for Sinaloan clubs, 
representing immigrants vis-à-vis U.S. and Mexican governments, thereby going beyond the local 
community and expanding their sphere of influence (Lizárraga et al 2010; Pintor 2014; FSC 
website). As Moctezuma (2011a) points out, these types of HTAs represent a higher form of 
organization compared to first level HTAs, transcending the local realm since their actions are 
more complex.  
Regarding the HTAs that have been part of the FSC, Arturo Lizárraga (2005), a pioneer in 
migration studies in Sinaloa, noted that the first HTAs emerged from localities of great migratory 
tradition and with high number of emigrants, that is, all rural. In this sense, I found that the 
emergence of HTAs that make up the Fraternidad ranged from the late 1970s to the end of 2000. 
In 2000, the FSC was comprised of 14 HTAs, which represented 10 municipalities (FSC Magazine 
2000). By 2016, the FSC grouped 19 HTAs, representing 11 municipalities (see table 1). As 
mentioned before, a significant number of HTAs are not formally registered. This is partially 
evidenced by comparing the HTAs registered in the IME database with HTAs that are part of the 
FSC: only 4 HTAs that currently pertain to the FSC were formally registered in 2014 (IME 2014). 
As such, it is important to take into account HTAs that are not part of the FSC. 
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Table 1. Hometown Associations that are part of the Fraternidad Sinaloense de California 
HTA Location in the US. Municipality in Mexico 
Club Escuinapa  Montebello, Ca. Escuinapa 
Club Angostura Paramount, Ca. Angostura 
Club Mazatlán Los Angeles, Ca Mazatlán 
Club El Rosario Los Angeles, Ca. El Rosario 
Club Culiacán Fontana, Ca.  Culiacán 
Amigos Del Roble La Puente, Ca. Mazatlán 
Club La Cruz de Elota El Monte, Ca. Elota 
Club Costa Rica Alhambra, Ca.  Culiacán 
Club Guasave Santa Ana, Ca.  Guasave 
Club Agua Verde Pasadena, Ca. El Rosario 
Club Rosa Morada Lynwood, Ca.  Mocorito 
Club Sinaloa de Leyva Los Angeles, Ca.  Sinaloa (municipality) 
Club Cosalá Los Angeles, Ca. Cosalá 
Club Verdura South Gate, Ca.  (No data) 
Club Mocorito Buena Park, Ca.  Mocorito 
Club Amole Los Angeles, Ca. Guasave 
Club Unidos por La 
Trinidad  
West Covina, Ca.  (No data) 
Club Bamoa  Lynwood, Ca.  Guasave 
Club Guamuchil Lynwood, Ca. Salvador Alvarado 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from FSC Magazine. 
The FSC non-profit status (501c3) means that they do not have any political affiliation. According 
to Portes et al (2008), this could inhibit them to directly participate in U.S. politics, for instance, 
in electoral campaigns; as opposed to informal organizations. However, despite this legal obstacle, 
some of its members are actively participating in U.S. politics and they are supporting pro-
immigrant candidates from the Democrat party. Others have been members of the Republican 
party, although one of them mentioned that the hostile political context, especially anti-immigrant 
rhetoric has distanced from the party.  
Portes et al. (2008) found that 65 % of Mexican, Colombian and Dominican organizations engaged 
in political activism such as supporting candidates, organizing debates between candidates, 
disseminating political propaganda among its members and/or the immigrant community in 
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general, among others. In addition to being active in the U.S, the FSC participate in binational 
programs such as the 3 X 1 Program, and they have worked with state and municipal governments 
in the past, and more recently they are doing so mainly with municipal governments. 
THE PROGRAMA TRES POR UNO PARA MIGRANTES IN SINALOA 
Organized Sinaloans in the U.S. have been sending collective remittances to their hometowns since 
the late 1970s. Most of these philanthropic engagements were carried out without governmental 
participation; even though there are also successful experiences where governments and HTAs 
have collaborated and developed projects.  
Since the implementation of the 3 X 1 Program at the federal level, projects in collaboration with 
the Sinaloan government have multiplied. All municipalities in Sinaloa, except Cosalá, have 
carried out at least one project taking advantage of the Program. In total, considering the 
participation of all Sinaloan HTAs, 201 projects have been carried out with a value that exceeds 
$6,368,000, of which almost 30% corresponds to contributions made by Sinaloan HTAs.  
This last figure shows that Sinaloan HTAs are providing more resources than their counterparts 
which contradicts the Rules of Operation (ROP 2018) of the program that establishes an equal 
share for each agent, a criterion that it is not fulfilled in many cases.  
Sinaloa’s performance in the development of the Program is low since it does not correspond to 
its proportion of migrants in the U.S., or with the amount of family remittances that Sinaloa 
receives. For example, in 2012, Sinaloan HTAs that participated in the 3 X 1 Program correspond 
to 0.87 % of the national total and the percentage of the projects carried out by Sinaloan HTAs 
accounted for 0.64% at the national level (See “economic factors” in the following chapter for 
more on the 3 x 1 Program).  
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Graph 4. Sinaloa: Contributions to the 3 X 1 Program by agent, 2002-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UMR-SEDESOL 2013 
*Contributions: Blue: Federal government, Purple: HTAs, green: Municipalities, Red: state government 
*Figures are in pesos 
5. FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN THE RELATION BETWEEN SINALOAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS AND THE SINALOAN DIASPORA 
The institutional capacity of Sinaloa’s diaspora policies is among the lowest in Mexico (See Graph 
4). In this chapter, I focus on the political, organizational, and economic factors that explain the 
absence of diaspora policies in Sinaloa, a state where, despite the significance of Sinaloan 
migrants’ contributions to the state’s economy and the well-being of thousands of families, and 
notwithstanding the vulnerability of an important proportion of Sinaloans living in the U.S., there 
are no policies created to address the demands and needs of the Sinaloan diaspora, and there is 
also no interest from the state government and some municipalities in developing a relationship 
with them. 
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Graph 5. Mexico: Institutional Capacity of Migrants offices by state, 2010 
 
Source: Ortega 2013: 120 
In most cases, and according to the existent literature on diaspora policies, the important influx of 
remittances and the significant number of Sinaloan migrants would lead to the existence of a more 
significant relation between the diaspora and their home government authorities, which in turn 
would also lead to the existence of, at least, some diaspora policies; however, as I have argued, 
this is not the case for Sinaloa.  
To unveil the reasons of the lack of cooperation between the Sinaloan state authorities and the 
diaspora, it was important to understand the origins of Sinaloan migration to California, the causes 
and evolution of the migratory process, the places of origin and destination, the general profile of 
the Sinaloan migrant, their organizational practices, and the impact of their family and collective 
remittances to the communities of origin. I have already done this analysis in the previous chapters. 
Now, I am able to draw connections between my initial exploratory research to find explanations 
that elucidates the current state of Sinaloan state-diaspora transnational relations.  
I propose to use a multifactorial analysis grouped into three spheres: political, organizational, and 
economic. The importance of these three realms also varies depending the level of analysis. This 
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multifactorial and multilevel approach is helpful to better visualize and explain the factors that are 
behind the “Sinaloan paradox”. 
POLITICAL FACTORS  
Democracy has been used as one of the variables that helps to explain the efforts of states to 
approach the diaspora. At the national level, I highlighted how domestic political factors such as 
the electoral competition in Mexico during the 1988 elections pushed Carlos Salinas de Gortari to 
court the diaspora and the Chicana/o community. Indeed, the instrumental hypothesis partially 
explains the approach of the Mexican state and subsequent policies implemented at the national 
level; although the state also responded to protect the human rights of Mexicans. At the subnational 
level, things become more complicated. Ortega (2012) explains that when local governments 
represent a different party to the main ruling party, their outreach actions to the diaspora could be 
part of a democratization process in which local governments represent excluded sectors of the 
population. This can contribute to greater plurality and democratization at the local level.    
In the case of Sinaloa, outreach for what could be seemingly political purposes on the part of local 
governments happened more markedly during the Salinismo period when Francisco Labastida, 
from the same party, was state governor. One of the purposes of many HTAs created during his 
term was to court state governors and Mexican officials, per Pescador’s account. After Labastida’s 
term, others state governors have visited and reunited with members of Sinaloan HTAs, however, 
they have not done it to obtain political benefits or as a response to political threats in Sinaloa since 
they do not need them economically or politically, nor are they sensitive to the needs of vulnerable 
Sinaloan migrants. According to Mario Cardenas, politicians have visited them to ask for favors. 
Mario recalled how during Renato Vega’s term as state governor (1993-1998), a representative of 
his administration was sent to arrange a visit to the Dodger’s stadium since the governor wanted 
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to pitch there and, apparently, they needed some sort of support from Sinaloan HTAs. In general, 
the treatment towards migrants has been arrogant.  
In my interviews with leaders such as José Ángel Barajas, Mario Cárdenas, and former Consul 
Pescador, all agreed that this lack of collaboration between the FSC (and Sinaloan HTAs in 
general) and Sinaloan state governments is longstanding. Another episode showing the rupture 
between members of the FSC and state officials from different administrations, was mentioned by 
Mr. Barajas and Mario Cárdenas. Because of conflicts they had with Mario López Valdez, 
governor of Sinaloa during the period 2010-2016, they decided to work autonomously. This 
version was corroborated in my interview with Mario Cárdenas:  
MARIO. When Malova [Governor’s nickname] came, we organized a breakfast and 
everything and I was one of those who asked him, because first he said that he was the 
most inclusive governor, (…) then I told him, I have just two questions for you, if you are 
the most inclusive, why aren’t we included in your [state] development project? 
[inaudible] Because the word “migrant” does not appear. If we are almost a million 
[migrants in the US], we represent the fifth part of Sinaloa’s population (…) you cannot 
consider yourself the most inclusive if we are not included [in the governor’s project]45.  
The governor’s reaction to Cardena’s questions was one of exasperation. These types of conflicts 
show how state-diaspora relations can be conflicting and does not occur automatically. The 
decision of the FSC to move away from “MALOVA’s” administration could well have been of 
paramount importance for its development and even its survival, since as Moctezuma (2013) points 
out, when the government tries to control or corporatize HTAs, they are substantially damaged, 
weakening them, and losing their sense of community.  
It is possible that this conflict between the FSC and the Governor led the latter to halt collaboration 
with HTAs through the 3 X 1 Program. When revising the contributions of the Program during the 
                                                      
45 Mario Cárdenas, interview by Fernando Villegas, May, 2017, personal records.   
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Governor’s administration (2010-2016), we can clearly observe that the share of the state suffered 
a drastic decrease, in fact, the state contributions to the Program ceased since 2012 (see Graph 4).  
Indeed, this conflict has resulted in a heavier burden for Sinaloan HTAs as they have absorbed the 
investment that the state government should have contributed. As stated before, this has not been 
an isolated event as other governors have shown no interest in collaborating with Sinaloan 
organized migrants in the U.S. In a short conversation between Arturo Santamaría and former 
Sinaloan Governor Juan S. Millán (1999-2004), he mentioned that the relation with members of 
the FSC during his term was “not pleasant”. Even more recently, the current state Governor 
Quirino Ordáz, a Mazatlecan who is affiliated to the PRI, rejected Barajas request to meet with the 
FSC to talk about the creation of the Casa Sinaloa in Los Angeles, something that the FSC has 
been asking for more than twenty years.  
HTA’s from other states like Guanajuato or Michoacán have succeeded in negotiating with state 
governors to gain political, economic or social benefits. One example is the Casa Michoacán, one 
of the most important community centers in Chicago, which was established by the Michoacán 
government as a response to pressures from Michoacan HTAs. The center provides different 
services to migrants and the community in general such as birth certificates, information regarding 
elections, or courses of various kinds. It has also served as an incubator for organizing political 
protests against anti-immigrant actions (Bada 2014). For Sinaloans, the lack of institutions like 
Casa Michoacán means having fewer opportunities to integrate in the U.S. and as transnational 
citizens.  
What are the reasons for this estrangement and lack of cooperation among the state government 
and Sinaloan HTAs within the political sphere? Bada (2014), pointed out that a critical moment in 
the evolution of state-migrant civil society relations was the “democratic” transition elections that 
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happened first, in states like Jalisco (1995) or Michoacan (2001), and then at the federal level, 
when Vicente Fox from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party) won the 
national elections in 2000, removing the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) from the Presidency, a party that had more than 70 years in power. This 
important episode in Mexican political history improved the relations between some state 
governments and organized immigrants in the U.S., since some governors understood the influence 
of migrants in different spheres of the Mexican society and because they needed their electoral and 
economic support. Even if migrants themselves could not vote, they sent money for the political 
campaigns of candidates and called their families to influence their vote.  
However, democratization processes within Mexico greatly varies and states have followed 
different directions. According to the Local Democracy Index, the state is ranked in the 16th place 
nationally with a negative figure. Compared to other states of the region, Sinaloa’s democracy 
performs poorly (Ventura and Ortega 2014). Indeed, I argue that Sinaloa has not experienced a 
true democratic transition. Almost all state governments have been part of the PRI, with the 
exception of MALOVA’s government. Even though he run for office with the PAN and won in 
2010, this was only a façade that enabled him to compete and, subsequently, win the elections. 
López Valdez has historically been part of the PRI. The rest of Sinaloan governors have not 
developed diaspora policies directed to Sinaloans and they have only managed federal programs 
in an incipient manner; with the exception of Labastida, who did it in response to Salinas’s 
instrumental approach to the diaspora. Using Vila’s (2007) categorization, the state government of 
Sinaloa has applied an incipient government model in their relations with the diaspora. 
It is true that political change happened in Sinaloa in the context of federalization and 
decentralization of power from the national center to the states. Beginning in 1983, and as a result 
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of pressure on the part of political parties opposed to the PRI −which has been the ruling party in 
Sinaloa− social movements, and NGOs, the state experienced a political electoral liberalization at 
the municipal level. Indeed, some electoral spaces where opened for the PAN and few other 
political parties such as the Labor Party, although this happened within a context of negotiations 
between political and entrepreneurial elites, thus, excluding civil society and discouraging social 
mobilization. Per Verdugo, civil society participation and inclusion “is a pending issue of local 
democratization” in Sinaloa (Verdugo 2009: 170). Since Sinaloan political elites have not even 
needed to include local civil society to retain power, it is simply impossible to expect them to seek 
political revenues abroad. Among Political Scientist focused on Mexican politics, there is no 
consensus whether this is a democratic setback or simply part of a necessary process towards 
democratic transition (Marengui and García 2014; Verdugo 2009).   
On the Sinaloan migrant side, if local elites and politicians do not ask for their political 
participation, they often won’t participate. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993 quoted by Danielson 
2013) have theorized this issue and they noted that being asked to participate politically is key in 
the participation or non-participation of people in political activities.  
We can conclude that Sinaloa’s government null interest in approaching the diaspora and the lack 
of diaspora policies is due, in part, to the prevalence of “anti-democratic” state orientations. Until 
recently, Sinaloa was ruled by an authoritarian political elite which was reluctant to incorporate 
Sinaloan civil society, whether it was inside Sinaloa or outside the national territory. The effects 
and impact of such orientations have transcended borders since Sinaloan immigrants in the United 
States have to deal with different obstacles without the support of their home state, and the 
transnational life of Sinaloan HTAs transnational life has been obstructed as a result of the disdain 
of the home state  
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ECONOMIC FACTORS  
Family remittances and collective remittances sent by Sinaloan migrants have not compelled state 
governments to recognize their contributions to the state economy, although they are a significant 
source of income for thousands of Sinaloan families. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, Sinaloan 
migrants are sending hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and in 2018 they sent a record 
amount, almost reaching 800 million dollars (see Graph 2). To have a better sense of the 
importance of remittances to the state’s economy, we can contrast them with the State Gross 
Domestic Product (SGDP). In 2013, family remittances accounted for 2.6% of the SGDP, standing 
above the national average of 2.1% in that year. In 2017, the remittances-SGDP ratio increased to 
3.40%. This increase show how Sinaloa is becoming more dependent on remittances. Moreover, 
if we make the same comparison but at the municipal level, remittances become more important 
since seven municipalities received remittances which accounted for more than 10% of their 
municipal GDP (MGDP) in 2010, and three are above 20%. For instance, in 2010, family 
remittances received in Cosalá, San Ignacio, and Badiraguato accounted for 26%, 20%, and 19% 
of the MGDP respectively46 (see Table 3).  
The Remittances/MGDP ratio is relevant to understand why some municipal governments are 
more interested in reaching their diaspora than others. The municipalities located in the mountains, 
which all are rural, are more dependent on remittances, which is reflected in the high proportion 
of this flows compared to their MGDP. All these municipalities have high levels of poverty and 
marginalization, negative population growth -which indicates depopulation-, high percentage of 
                                                      
46 Personal calculations based on a study conducted in 2014, which can be found in Mendoza et al. 2014, and data 
from BANXICO and BBVA/CONAPO (2018). Municipal remittances data is available for the year 2017, however, 
the most recent data calculating GDP at the municipal level in Sinaloa comes from 2010. Due to limitations in time 
and information, I calculated the weight of remittances at the municipal level using comparable data from 2010.  
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households that have at least one resident living in the U.S. and, consequently, a high proportion 
of households receiving remittances. Due to these harsh conditions, remittances are used mainly 
just for consumption. The results of my study on remittances in Sinaloa coincide with other studies 
such as Valdivia and Lozano (2010) and Montoya (2008), where it seems very difficult for 
remittances to promote a process of self-sustaining economic growth, at least for the municipalities 
located in the mountains. 
Table 3. Sinaloa: Family Remittances and Municipal GDP comparison, 2010 
Municipality Family 
remittances in 
2010 (million 
pesos) 
GDP, 2010 (millions of pesos 
at constant prices) 
Remittances/municipal 
GDP ratio (%) 
1 Cosalá $                       91 $                         351 26.07 
2 San Ignacio $                       92 $                         448 20.52 
3 Badiraguato $                       57 $                         301 18.87 
4 Choix $                    103 $                         717 14.33 
5 Concordia $                       64 $                         550 11.68 
6 Sinaloa $                    305 $                     2,633 11.58 
7 Mocorito $                    248 $                     2,163 11.47 
8 Rosario $                    109 $                     1,897 5.75 
9 Elota $                    204 $                     3,587 5.68 
10 Guasave $                    813 $                   17,710 4.59 
11 Salvador A. $                    262 $                     5,971 4.39 
12 Escuinapa $                    117 $                     3,087 3.78 
13 El Fuerte $                    123 $                     3,660 3.36 
14 Angostura $                       86 $                     2,653 3.25 
15 Navolato $                    174 $                     8,740 1.99 
16 Culiacán $                 1,734 $                 108,812 1.59 
17 Mazatlán $                    719 $                   48,256 1.49 
18 Ahome $                    632 $                   44,084 1.43 
SINALOA $                 5,939 $                 255,621 2.32 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Mendoza et al (2014) 
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Once I have demonstrated the significance of remittances sent by Sinaloan migrants to their home 
communities, is difficult to understand why there are no diaspora policies created to court or attend 
the necessities of Sinaloan migrants. According to the instrumental hypothesis, states with 
significant proportion of migrants and remittances are more prone to court the diaspora in order to 
use their resources for development purposes in their communities of origin, or to create policies 
to maintain their linkages to sustain the flow of remittances. However, as I have argued, this is not 
the case in Sinaloa. Although remittances at the state level represent 3.40% of the STGDP, the 
state government do not entirely depend on these resources and they are willing to exclude 
migrants from the polity. This is reflected in the low levels of diaspora policies in the state. 
Nonetheless, when we compare Sinaloa with states that have high levels of institutional capacity 
in their approach to the diaspora such as Coahuila or State of Mexico, that have similar 
Remittances/STGDP ratio, lower levels of MI, and less proportion of migrants with respect to their 
own population (see Table 4), then, the instrumental hypothesis is less useful as an explanatory 
framework.  
I argue that the economic variables that I have analyzed do not correspond with the level of 
institutional capacity of diaspora policies in Sinaloa. This is shown in Table 4, where I highlight 
four states with the lowest level of institutional capacity towards their diaspora: Sinaloa, Baja 
California Sur, Quintana Roo, and Campeche; and four states with the highest institutional 
capacity, that is, Michoacán, Zacatecas, State of Mexico, and Coahuila.  
The instrumental hypothesis does explain, for instance, why Campeche, Baja California Sur, or 
Quintana Roo are among the states with the lowest levels of institutional capacity in Mexico. They 
all have very low Migratory Intensity, and their economies are not dependent on remittances as 
the Remittances/SGDP ratio shows. It also explains two cases in the other extreme, that is, 
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Michoacán and Zacatecas, which are the states with the highest level of institutional capacity in 
their approach to the diaspora. These states have high levels of MI and their economies are 
dependent on remittances, therefore, their home state governments and municipalities have 
developed diaspora policies for attending the needs of these groups of migrants, to court them for 
obtaining political revenues, and for implementing co-development programs in their communities 
of origin, as many other scholars have documented (Bada 2014; Moctezuma 2015; Ortega 2012; 
Yrizar and Barbosa 2010; Fernández de Castro et al 2007). 
Source: Own elaboration with information obtained from Ortega (2013: 112, 113).  
The state and municipalities in Sinaloa have only worked with migrants through the Federal 
Program 3 X 1, and the economic impact of the program to the state’s economy is not significant. 
The investment of the 3 x 1 program from its inception to mid-2012 was $6,368,000 USD 
approximately. Sinaloa’s participation in the program does not correspond to the proportion of 
migrants in the U.S., or the amount of family remittances received. For instance, in 2012, Sinaloan 
Table 4. Migratory Phenomenon, different variables: 2005, 2010 
Mexican 
state 
Migrants in 
the US 
(2005) 
Proportion 
of migrants 
with respect 
to their own 
pop (2005) 
Migratory 
Intensity 
(2010) 
Deported or 
repatried 
migrants 
(2010) 
Remittances/St
ate GDP 
relation (2010) 
Institutional 
Capacity  
Sinaloa 208,219 7.5 Medium 20,023 2.4 Very Low 
Campeche 10, 466 1.3 Very Low 1202 0.1 Very Low 
Baja 
California 
Sur 23,287 4.6 Very Low 385 0.6 Very Low 
Quintana 
Roo 23,542 2.2 Very Low 782 0.7 Very Low 
              
Michoacán 1,061,867 25.1 Very High 50,322 9.4 Very High 
Zacatecas 508,924 35.9 Very High 10,790 6.9 Very High 
Estado de 
México 565,457 4.5 Low 24,503 2 Very High 
Coahuila 192,115 7.6 Low 4,494 0.8 Very High 
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HTAs that participated in the Program represented 0.87% nationally; the projects carried out 
0.64%, and the federal investment corresponded to 1.59% of the total federal resources. One of the 
main explanations is the low or null interest of the state government to collaborate with migrants, 
as I have argued.  
However, at the municipal level, collaboration between local authorities and migrants is different 
and more active. Indeed, municipios are closer to the diaspora since they are able to create direct 
linkages and there are more possibilities to negotiate among themselves due to a more nuanced 
correlation of forces, in Gramsci’s terms. At this level of analysis, the instrumental hypothesis 
helps us to partially explain the phenomenon. In my interviews with municipal officials from all 
the state, I found that it is in the most marginalized Sinaloan municipalities where state officials 
have or are willing to collaborate with HTAs due to budgetary constraints. On the other hand, 
municipal officials from the strongest economies at the municipal level such as Culiacán, Mazatlán 
are less interested in collaborating with Sinaloan HTAs and they have only done it on a few 
occasions. This is explained when we analyze the Remittances/MGDP ratio, which is very low in 
this municipalities (see Table 3). Some officials from these municipalities had no idea how the 3 
x 1 Program works. In other cases, they have used the resources of the program without including 
migrants or recognizing their contributions, and solely for the purpose of obtaining more resources 
for public works. This is the case of a soccer field that was built In Mazatlán  
In sum, economic factors do not entirely account for the lack of interest on the part of the state 
government to create diaspora policies, other variables need to be taken into account when 
explaining the phenomenon at this level. At the municipal level, economic factors become more 
relevant when explaining the disinterest of municipal officials from the strongest economies such 
as Culiacán, Mazatlán, or Ahome, or the strong interest and higher level of collaboration from 
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municipalities with high levels of marginalization and highly dependent on remittances such as 
Cosalá, San Ignacio, Badiraguato, or Choix.  
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
Since the economic contributions of Sinaloans have not been enough for occupying an important 
space in the agenda of state governors, organized Sinaloans migrants in the form of Hometown 
Associations have demanded their inclusion. Nonetheless, unlike what has happened in other 
states, the demands of Sinaloan HTAs have not taken effect and have not been consolidated. 
Besides the political and economic factors, I presented and that partially explain the lack of 
diaspora policies directed to Sinaloan migrants abroad, I argue that Sinaloans have not been able 
to form strong non-governmental organizations or HTAs neither in Los Angeles nor in Sinaloa. 
Both Sinaloan Civil Societies have not been able to pressure local governments so that their 
demands are heard, included and implemented.   
In the case of the Sinaloan Migrant Civil Society in the form of HTAs, a crucial stage began in 
2002 with the creation of the 3 x 1 Program for Migrants. After 2002, Sinaloan HTAs multiplied. 
By using the data provided by the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, I found that most 
Sinaloan clubs were registered after 2002, that is, 13 HTAs were created after that year, which 
represents 76.47% of the total HTAs formally registered with IME. In contrast, HTAs created 
before that date represent only 23.53 % (see Table 5.). What these figures show, align with 
Duquette-Rury and Bada’s (2013) findings, were they noted a significant increase in the 
emergence of HTAs at the national level as a result of the implementation of the 3 X 1 Program. 
The authors found that the percentage of HTAs created after 2000 at the national level represents 
76% of the total, and only 23% were created before that date, replicating almost exactly the data I 
found in the case of Sinaloan HTAs. 
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Table 5. Sinaloa: Hometown Associations  
HTA 
Foundation 
Year Place of Foundation 
Municipalit
y 
# 
members 
Asociación de 
Concordenses 2011 
Los Angeles, 
California Concordia. 10 
Club Elotense 2011 Lynwood, California Elota 10 
La Angostura N/D Monaca, Pennsylvania Angostura 12 
Cerro de Culiacán-San Luis 2013 St. Louis, Missouri  27 
Club Activo Sinaloa de 
California 1995 
Los Angeles, 
California  326 
Club E Amole 1995 Cudahy, California Guasave 24 
Club Guamuchil 2011 Lynwood, California Guamuchil 150 
Club Mazatlán 1994 
Los Angeles, 
California Mazatlán 400 
Club Rosa Morada 2008 Lynwood, California Mocorito 50 
Cubiri del Amole 2009 Downey, California Guasave 100 
El amole 1999 Bell, California Guasave 100 
Club de Migrantes Amigos 
de los Mochis 2010 Mesa, Arizona Ahome N/D 
Desarrollo Paisano de 
Rosario 2007 Phoenix, Arizona Rosario 10 
El Hijo Pródigo N/D Phoenix, Arizona Ahome 10 
Club Social Pericos USA 2007 
Moreno Valley, 
California Mocorito  
Club Angostura en 
California 2011 Santa Ana, California 
La 
Angostura 10 
Club Migrante de Sinaloa 
Norte 2009 Greensboro, Carolina del Norte 6 
Federación de Sinaloenses 
del Condado de Orange 2004 Garden Grove, California 75 
Asociación de Sinaloenses 
en Arizona 2008 Tucson, Arizona 
 
 45 
Source: Villegas (2014) 
The emergence of most HTAs before 2002 was spontaneous. After that year, financial support 
from the 3 X 1 Program encouraged both Sinaloan migrants in the U.S. and primarily municipal 
governments, due to budgetary constraints as a result of the State withdrawal within the neoliberal 
context, to create HTAs and to expand the scope of their contributions. Still, the number of 
Sinaloan HTAs is limited if compared with the number of HTAs in other regions of the country 
 76 
 
with a similar migratory tradition or volume of migrants in the U.S. In fact, as I have stated, there 
are great disparities among Mexican HTA’s in terms of organizational development and 
transnational engagements.  
If we take into account HTAs that are part of the FSC but not registered in the IME database, the 
number increases, although not substantially. In addition, not all HTAs that are counted as part of 
the FSC or that are registered in the IME database are active. Some of them are only artificially 
created by municipal governments to be able to qualify for the 3 x 1 Program, the so-called “Ghost 
HTAs”. Others that pertains to the FSC are not active anymore according to Mario Cárdenas. 
Indeed, he mentioned that there are just few HTAs that are really active, what accounts for the low 
levels of organizational capacity of Sinaloans in the U.S. How do we explain that there are so few 
Sinaloan organizations in the U.S.? 
One hypothesis is related to the type of leadership and internal organization of the FSC, since it 
has been the main HTA in the history of Sinaloa. Lizárraga et al 2010 argued that the FSC is 
different from other HTAs whose organizational mechanics is authoritarian and corporatist as the 
ones described by Moctezuma (2013), where clientelism is reproduced since it is one of the 
characteristics of Mexican politics. The authors stated that the FSC elects the members of its board 
of directors in a democratic fashion, which in turn represents the organization. In addition, HTAs 
that make up the FSC have a voice within the organization, where they can vote and, consequently, 
have the final say in the decision-making process. Part of this process is also described on the FSC 
website, thus coinciding in the description provided by Lizárraga et al (2010). However, during a 
personal conversation with José Ángel Barajas, when asked about the selection process of the 
board he clearly stated that he is the one who chooses them. In addition, there are other voices 
from within the FSC and from external actors that criticize the internal organizational practices of 
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some leaders of the FSC. They believe that the lack of internal democracy and authoritarian 
practices in the management of the FSC, have greatly affected the growth of the organization and 
that even obstructs the emergence of more Sinaloan HTAs. In fact, some federal officials that 
managed the 3 x 1 Program have made serious accusations regarding the actions of some of their 
leaders.   
Another hypothesis that helps to understand low levels of association of Sinaloans in the form of 
clubes de migrantes or HTAs is more structural. A great proportion of Sinaloans hold 
undocumented as status, actually, Lizarraga et al (2010) estimated that 59% of Sinaloans in the 
U.S. are undocumented. To corroborate the high proportion of Sinaloans without legal documents, 
we can analyze the number of Sinaloans deported in 2017. According to Serrano and Jaramillo 
(2018), Sinaloans deported by U.S. immigration authorities represent 4.6% of the entire number 
of Mexican migrants deported. Indeed, Sinaloan migrants are a highly vulnerable population 
compared to other Mexicans in the U.S. They were not substantially benefitted by US policies 
such as IRCA, which obstructed their integration to the U.S. society. Without legal status, 
Sinaloans have not been able to form numerous organizations, or have been able to achieve 
significant levels of institutionalization in their organizational forms. In addition, previous research 
has noted that migrants from rural areas are more likely to form HTAs (Zabin and Escala; Lizárraga 
et al 2010), which in turn are more prone to help their communities of origin. This also helps to 
explain why Sinaloans are less prone to form HTAs since they come mostly from urban contexts.  
In sum, an intersection of political, economic and organizational factors explains the lack of 
diaspora policies created to attend the needs and demands of the Sinaloan diaspora. HTAs in 
Sinaloa have been unable to forge an effective compromise with the Sinaloan state government in 
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Mexico, or with municipal governments that results in the creation of diaspora policies to attend 
their needs and demands. 
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